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THE 1977 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS:
A TACTICAL RETREAT FROM THE
TECHNOLOGY-FORCING STRATEGY?
BRUCE M KRAMER *
Environmental concerns, long neglected, merit high priority, and
Congress properly has made protection of the public health its
paramount consideration .... But the shutdown of an urban
area's electrical service could have an even more serious impact
on the health of the public than that created by a decline in am-
bient air quality. The result apparently required by this legisla-
tion in its present form could sacrifice the well-being of a large
metropolitan area through the imposition of inflexible demands
that may be technologically impossible to meet and indeed may
no longer even be necessary to the attainment of the goal of
clean air.
I believe that Congress, if fully aware of this draconian possi-
bility would strike a different balance.'
The Clean Air Act of 1970 was bold and innovative in its approach
toward achieving a goal of health-protecting air quality.2 New and
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1972; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1975.
1. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 271-72 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). The 1970 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (1970), were actually amendments to the 1967 Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). In reality the amendments so drastically and completely
changed the earlier act that they are referred to as the 1970 Clean Air Act. The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), in addi-
tion to making major additions and deletions from the 1970 Amendments, recodified
the entire statute at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642. The placement of the entire 1970 Amend-
ments within one number, 1857, had required an unnecessarily complex system of
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radical tactics and strategies were utilized to attack the nation-wide
problem of air pollution. A much greater role was mandated for the
federal government to overcome a perceived state indifference to the
health endangering aspects of air pollution. Despite these salutary as-
pects, the 1970 Amendments were complex, imprecise, inconsistent
and incomplete. In several instances the strategies developed were the
product of a three-month Conference Committee, leading to a bill
very different in many respects from both the House and Senate pro-
posals.3 The result has been a veritable barrage of comments, deci-
sions, and interpretations by the courts,4 by Congress,5 and by
academicians6 debating the various strategies employed by the 1970
Amendments.
letter and subsection citation. Citation to the Clean Air Act prior to 1977 win include
the section of the 1970 Act, its 42 U.S.C. § 1857 citation, and conclude with the new
citation at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1977).
3. See Kramer, The 1970 Clean AirAmendments: Federalism in Action or Inaction,
6 TE xAs TECH. L. REv. 47, 66-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kramer I].
4. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426
U.S. 167 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60
(1975); Buckeye Power Inc. v. EPA, 525 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Buckeye Power III; Buckeye Power Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) [herein-
after cited as Buckeye Power I]; Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3rd Cir.
1975), vacated and remande4 427 U.S. 902 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Duquesne
Light II]; Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 427 U.S. 902 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Duquesne Light I].
5. Senator Muskie estimated that the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental
Pollution and its predecessors had held over 60 days of oversight hearings on the 1970
Amendments. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1977) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 127]. Between 1975 and 1977 the Subcommittee held 18 days of hearings,
58 days of mark-up sessions, heard 138 witnesses and compiled 9,470 pages of testi-
mony in preparing the 1977 Amendments. Id at 1. See, e.g., Hearings on the Imple-
mentation ofthe Clean Air Act Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Work4 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-3 (1975); Hearings on the
Implementation of Transportation Controls Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pol-
lution of the Senate Comn on Public Works 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-3 (1974);
Hearings Before the Subcomna on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works4 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. See, e.g, Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Amendments of
1970: The First Six Year 6 ECOL L. Q. 161 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kramer II];
Kramer I, supra note 3; La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes 62 IowA L. REv. 771 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacroce?
Problems ofFederalism in Mandating State Implementation ofNational En vironmental
Policy 86 YALE L. 1196 (1977); Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and
Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review ofEnvironmentalDecisionmaking: Lessons
from the Clean Air Ac4 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977).
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Perhaps the most innovative and most strongly opposed technique
utilized by the 1970 Amendments was the concept of "health-based"
standards as the vehicle for a technology-forcing strategy.7 A technol-
ogy-forcing strategy using health-based standards means that protec-
tion of the public health can be the sole consideration in either setting
an appropriate standard or in attaining it. This obviously excludes
from consideration any economic or technological feasibility issues.
Similarly, a health-based standard does not consider other social
ramifications of its implementation. Economic, social or technologi-
cal factors are relevant only in setting standards where the health-
based standards have already been attained or where a variety of al-
ternative emission control strategies would each achieve attainment
within the designated time limits. This strategy necessarily involves
an "all-or-nothing" result. In the case of air pollution, either the sta-
tionary sources develop the technology necessary to limit emissions to
achieve health-based standards, or some sources must be shut down.
This shutdown alternative was specifically endorsed in the Senate
Committee Report on the 1970 Amendments.'
There are three basic elements vital to the effectiveness of the tech-
nology-forcing strategy for air pollution. The 1970 Amendments
dealt with all three of these elements, some more successfully than
others. The first involved setting the standard to be achieved. The
1970 Amendments mandated immediate development of National
Primary Ambient Air Quality Standards (NPAAQS) 9 for five basic
air pollutants. The NPAAQS were each to be set at a level sufficient
to protect the public health, allowing for an adequate margin of
safety. o
The second element of the strategy involved implementing or at-
taining the NPAAQS by a definite date, again without considering
feasibility issues. In the air pollution context, this primarily involved
7. See Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology-Forcing" in the Clean Air Ac4 [1975]
6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 12-15; La Pierre, supra note 6, at 771-73.
8. The committee determined that ... the health of people is more important
than the question of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality stand-
ards is technically feasible. . . .Therefore, the Committee determined that ex-
isting sources of pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be
closed down ....
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
11961.
9. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp. 1977)).
10. Id
1978]
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an attempt to ascertain the total amount of pollutants that would
cause the ambient air levels to reach the maximum level allowed."I
Next, the amount of emissions from both stationary and mobile
sources had to be ascertained. Finally, controllable emissions were
limited so that the total tonnage of emissions from all sources would
fall below the allotted amount.' 2 For this allotment system to operate
successfully, deviations from the standards must be strictly limited so
that the attainment date or individual source controls are not easily
evaded. The system created by the 1970 Amendments was based on a
goal of attaining NPAAQS by May 31, 1975, or as expeditiously as
practicable. 13 Additionally, the 1970 Amendments attempted to limit
extensions, variances, and revisions by imposing cumbersome and
difficult procedural and substantive requirements as conditions prec-
edent to granting extensions.
1 4
The third critical aspect of the technology-forcing strategy is a pro-
vision for quick and certain enforcement authority. The probability
of enforcement tends to ensure that polluters at least attempt to de-
velop and utilize requisite technology, rather than delaying compli-
ance through litigation, by making it less profitable to pay attorney's
fees than to pay the research and engineering costs of compliance.
15
The 1970 Amendments sought to improve the previous system of
state enforcement, or lack thereof,16 by granting a federal right of
enforcement. "Additionally, the 1970 Amendments sought to limit
judicial review of the emission standards contained in the state im-
11. This basic process has been accurately described as a problem of "atmospheric
loadings." Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibii&y in Clean Air Enforcement
Against Stationary Sourceg 89 HARv. L. REv. 316, 325-26 (1975).
12. Id. Unfortunately the state of the technological art and the research base in
1970 and at present is such that, for most of the above, the calculations are imprecise,
depend upon local atmospheric and terrestrial conditions, and are otherwise not eas-
ily quantifiable. Furthermore, the transport of air pollutants from one region to an-
other is an area just now being explored in depth.
13. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West Supp. 1977)).
14. See text accompanying notes 59-78 infra
15. SeeLa Pierre, supranote 6, at 771-73. This assumes, of course, that the tech-
nology can be developed within the specified time limits. Certainly the legislators in
1970 did not know whether or not the requisite technologies for stationary sources
would or could be developed. Three of the pollutant standards are heavily dependent
on controls over motor vehicle emissions.
16. SeeKramer I, supranote 3, at 56-58, 69-71 & 77-78.
17. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. 1977)).
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plementation plans (SIP) to an appellate proceeding brought within
thirty days of the acceptance of the SIP by the Administrator.'" The
1970 Amendments thus seemed to preclude raising feasibility issues
as a defense in a later enforcement or criminal proceeding. Such pro-
ceedings were limited to the single question of whether the standard
was violated, and could not consider whether the standard was actu-
ally achievable.' 9
Between the enactment of the 1970 Amendments and the decision
in Union Electric,2" the courts, Congress, and the EPA tried to come
to grips with the "all-or-nothing" result inherent in the technology-
forcing strategy. Some courts refused to accept it,21 others attempted
to modify it,2" while others simply rewrote the 1970 Amendments.23
18. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307,42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7607 (West Supp. 1977)).
19. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970) provided in
part:
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission stan-
dard under section 112, any standard of performance under section 111, any
standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be prescribed
under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5), any control
or prohibition under section 211, or any standard under section 231 may be filed
only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A
petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan under section 110 or section 111 (d) may be filed only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such peti-
tion shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval,
or after such date if such petition is based solely on grounds existing after such
30th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for enforcement.
This section was altered by the 1977 Amendments, but its basic purpose remained
intact. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, §§ 303(d), 305(a), (c), (f)-(h), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977). See generallyLuneburg & Rosette, Judicial
Review Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197a 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
667 (1974). See also Note, A Limited Audiencefor Protestations af Impossibility: Pro-
posed Proceduresfor Raising Infeasibility Claims Under the Federal Clean Air Amend-
ments of197a 61 IowA L. REv. 723 (1976).
20. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
21. Duquesne Light II, 522 F.2d 1186 (3rd Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded 427
U.S. 902 (1976); St. Joe Minerals v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1975), vacated as
moos 425 U.S. 987 (1976); Duquesne Light I, 481 F.2d 1(3rd Cir. 1973), vacatedand
remanded 427 U.S. 902 (1976).
22. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
23. Buckeye Power 1, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of these varied
court responses to the 1970 Amendments, see Bleicher, supra note 11, at 329-47.
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It is precisely this dilemma that Justice Powell alluded to in his con-
curring opinion in Union Electric.4 Some courts which accepted the
congressional mandate suggested, sometimes vigorously, that the pol-
luters go to the legislative branch for relief.25
It was readily apparent to Congress in 1975 that the "all-or-noth-
ing" strategy had not led to sufficient technological breakthroughs for
stationary sources of air pollution to attain the NPAAQS. 6 As of
August 31, 1975, it was estimated that some 132 of approximately 247
Air Quality Control Regions (AQCR's) nationwide were not ex-
pected to attain the NPAAQS for particulate matter. Another
thirty-five AQCR's were not expected to attain the NPAAQS for sul-
fur dioxide.2 ' Because this would necessitate shutdowns of some sta-
tionary sources of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide in non-
attainment areas, as well as prohibiting future new sources of air pol-
lution, the possibility that Justice Powell envisioned threatened to be-
come a reality.
In the following two years Congress debated how to deal with the
reality of non-attainment. Congress was faced with three alternatives:
continue the 1970 Amendments' approach and follow the technol-
ogy-forcing strategy to its logical conclusion: namely, the shutting
down of many stationary sources of air pollution; abandon totally the
technology-forcing strategy of the 1970 Amendments and utilize a
new system whereby feasibility and social issues are relevant
throughout the decisionmaking process; or compromise the 1975
deadline but retain technology-forcing as a strategy. Position two
would make the protection of the public health only one of several
factors to be weighed in any particular decision to regulate the emis-
sions of individual sources. Position three would acknowledge that
three years was an insufficient period to achieve control over 22,000
24. See note 1 and accompanying text supra
25. See, e.g, Santa Rosa v. EPA, 534 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1976), where the court
refused to grant petitioner relief from a proposed regulation imposing 100% gas ra-
tioning in the Los Angeles metropolitan area in order to meet the NPAAQS. Citing
the First Circuit in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), the
Ninth Circuit concluded: "Neither EPA nor this court has any right to decide that it is
better to maintain pollutants at a level hazardous to health than to require the degree
of public sacrifice needed to reduce them to tolerable limits." id at 154.
26. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environ.
mental Pollution of the Senate Comm on Public Workl 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
27. EPA, STATE AIR POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1-2 (1975).
28. Id The problem with attainment of the NPAAQS for the other three pollu-
tants is compounded by their multiple sources, both stationary and mobile.
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major stationary sources or to develop control technology adequate
to achieve emission limitations necessary for NPAAQS attainment.
Concurrent with this congressional review was the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Union Electric, which confirmed the
technology-forcing mandate of the 1970 Amendments and the result-
ing necessity of stationary source shutdowns in many areas of the
country. Congress responded by enacting the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 197729 which, while endorsing the technology-forcing strat-
egy, greatly weakened two of its primary means of implementation
by removing the non-flexible attainment date and expanding the
availability of extensions, revisions, and variances.
This Article considers post- Union Electric litigation involving sta-
tionary sources and the original technology-forcing strategy, and ana-
lyzes the impact of the 1977 Amendments on the continued viability
of the technology-forcing strategy for stationary sources. To some ex-
tent any delay, extension, or variance emasculates the technology-
forcing strategy. However, faced with the reality of non-attainment
and the possible closure of important industrial operations, and ap-
parently heeding Justice Powell's advice in Union Electric,3" Con-
gress decided that delay was better than shutdowns.
I. NATIONAL PRIMARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
The 1970 Amendments left little doubt that the NPAAQS were to
be health-based standards,3 and this congressional mandate to ex-
clude economic and technological factors was put into effect by the
Administrator.32 The use of health-based NPAAQS has also engen-
dered the least amount of litigation or lobbying of the three segments
of the technology-forcing triumvirate.
No NPAAQS has been successfully attacked on feasibility or social
grounds. A national secondary ambient air quality standard
(NSAAQS) was successfully challenged in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
EP4,33 but solely on the basis that the scientific data used to support
the standard was insufficient to show the alleged deleterious effect on
29. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1977).
30. Seenote 1 and accompanying text supra
31. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 109,42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp. 1977)). For a more complete legislative history of
NPAAQS, see Kramer II, supranote 6, at 172-75.
32. EPA Promulgation of Primary and Secondary Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186
(1971),
33. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"1978]
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the general welfare from exposure to the selected level for sulfur di-
oxide.34 The only case that has arisen since Union Electric dealing
with the setting of NPAAQS was brought by an environmental group
and not a polluter.35 Again, the concept of exclusively health-based
standards was not challenged. Rather, at issue was the Administra-
tor's duty to create an NPAAQS for lead once he had determined
that lead was a harmful pollutant emitted from various mobile or
stationary sources.36 The Administrator had taken the position that,
even though lead was a health-endangering pollutant for which a cri-
teria document had been issued, he was not required to promulgate
an NPAAQS because lead emissions could be regulated under other
sections of the 1970 Amendments. 37 The Second Circuit considered
the integration of the mandatory attainment date and the setting of
NPAAQS as being "central to the Amendments' regulatory scheme,"
citing Union Electric.38 Thus, once the Administrator makes the nec-
essary determination under section 108 that pollutants emitting from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources could reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,39 he has no dis-
cretion under the statute to regulate such pollutants through any
process other than the setting of an NPAAQS.4 ° The result has been a
proposed NPAAQS for lead of 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter,
based on a monthly average.4' The setting of a new NPAAQS trig-
34. Id at 848.
35. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976),
aff'g411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Id at 324-25. See also Clean Air Act of 1970, § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3
(1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West Supp. 1977)).
37. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir.
1976). These other strategies include regulation under standards of performance for
new or modified stationary sources. See Clean Air Act of 1970, § 111, 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-6 (1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411 (West Supp. 1977)), in which
economic factors were specifically included as part of the decisionmaking process.
The other sections dealt with the lead in the atmosphere that results from motor vehi-
cle emissions.
38. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir.
1976), quotingfrom Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 258 (1976).
39. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West Supp. 1977)).
40. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.
1976).
41. Proposed National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 42 Fed. Reg. 63,076 (1977);
[1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1235. Current EPA Administrator Costle has stated that
no further listings of pollutants under §§ 108 & 109 are anticipated by the EPA in the
immediate future. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1334.
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gers the SIP process whereby states, within nine months of the final
promulgation of the NPAAQS, must submit to the Administrator a
program for the attainment, within three years, of the NPAAQS.42
This technology-forcing strategy for lead emissions from stationary
sources may run into the same problems faced by Congress in 1975
with the non-attainment of the NPAAQS for other standards. Thus,
unless more stringent regulation of mobile source emissions is devel-
oped,43 the NPAAQS for lead may be unachievable without the shut-
down of certain stationary sources.
Meanwhile, in Congress there was a growing attempt to change the
health-based NPAAQS to economic, technological, energy, and
health-based standards. In both the 1974" and 197545 Senate Over-
sight Hearings on the Clean Air Act several industry representatives
urged such a change.' However, neither the proposed 1976 Amend-
42. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970) (currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(l)-(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1977)). States can apply for a
two-year extension of the attainment date. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-5(e) (1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(e) (West Supp. 1977)).
43. The problem of controlling lead emissions points out the difficulties states face
in transferring federally-set national ambient air qualtity standards into emission
standards for an SIP. Since lead emissions originate from both stationary and mobile
sources, the states must accept as a given amount the tonnage of lead emissions from
mobile sources, which are regulated solely by the EPA. Therefore, any decision
made as to stationary source load allocation is severely restricted. Conceivably, EPA
decisions on lead emissions from automobiles and lead content of gasoline and paint
could fully occupy the atmospheric loadings allowed to attain the NPAAQS. Thus
the only SIP a state could submit that would receive approval is one which allowed no
lead emissions from stationary sources. The result would be the ultimate in technol-
ogy-forcing strategy: technology would either be developed within three years to
reach zero lead emissions or the industry would be shut down.
44. Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on EnvironmentalPollu-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Public Workg 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Oversight Hearings].
45. Hearings on the Implementation of the Clean Air Act-1975 Before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works 94th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Oversight Hearings].
46. See. e.g., 1974 Oversight Hearings, supra note 44, at 230-31 (Statement of
American Iron and Steel Institute); id at 193 (Statement of Earl Mallick, United
States Steel Co.); id at 216-18 (Statement of American Iron and Steel Institute); id at
629-30 (Statement of WJ. Copoc, Texaco, Inc.); id at 699-702 (Statement of Edward
Starke, Shell Oil Co.); id at 759-60 (Statement of P.N. Gammelgard, Am. Petroleum
Institute); id. at 769 (Supplementary statement of Texaco, Inc.); pt. 2, at 1388-89
(Supplementary statement of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.). See 1975 Oversight
Hearings, supra note 45, at 320, 325-27, 394-417 (Statements and exhibits of Frank
Zarb, Federal Energy Admin.); id at 1794-95 (Statement of Am. Mining Cong.).
1978]
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ments47 nor the 1977 Amendments4" adopted this position.49
While maintaining the integrity of the health-based feature of the
NPAAQS, the 1977 Amendments created an ongoing review proce-
dure for setting an NPAAQS. ° An independent review team, ap-
pointed by the Administrator, is to comment at five-year intervals on
the NPAAQS and its underlying criteria documents. The team is
given the express duty of "advis[ing] the Administrator of any ad-
verse public health, welfare, social, economic or energy effects which
may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of
such national ambient air quality standards."' I However, the legisla-
tive history of this new section leaves unaffected the earlier mandate
to exclude those factors from the Administrator's decision to set any
particular NPAAQS 2 This advisory power, according to the House
Report, was not intended to be "used as a basis for the Administrator
to disapprove any State's plan."53 This seems to preclude the Admin-
istrator from utilizing the information contained in the report in set-
ting the NPAAQS, but allows the Administrator to utilize the
information in reviewing proposed SIP's.
Because certain air pollutants may not have a threshold level be-
neath which there are no adverse health effects, the 1970 Amend-
47. S. 252,94th Cong., 2d Sess. as reported in S. REP. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 717]; H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. as
reportedinH.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1175].
48. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 101-315, 91 Stat.
685 (1977).
49. Compare S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 14-15 with H.R. REP. No. 1175,
supra note 47, at 152-56 and with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, §§ 106, 120, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7410, 7422 (West Supp. 1977).
50. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp.
1977). The ambient air quality standards had already been extensively reviewed and
reaffirmed prior to the 1977 Amendments. See, e.g, [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 12,
127, 464, 486, 696 & 924; [1975] 6 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 933.
51. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp.
1977).
52. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180-83 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 294]. The Senate bill did not contain any changes in § 109 of the 1970
Amendments. S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Conference Committee Re-
port merely stated that the Senate conferees had acceded to the House version with
certain changes not relevant to the discussion here. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 124 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 564]. This may be a moot
point since the present Administrator has stated that lead is expected to be the last
NPAAQS pollutant named. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1334.
53. H.R. REP. No. 564, supranote 52, at 182-83.
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ments gave the Administrator power to directly regulate the
emissions of hazardous pollutants,54 in addition to regulatory power
through the NPAAQS strategy. This alternative process utilized a
technology-forcing strategy by requiring the Administrator to set
emissions standards for new, modified, or existing stationary sources
at levels sufficient to protect the public health and welfare, with ade-
quate margins for safety.55 As with the setting of NPAAQS, "public
health" is the sole basis for the standard. In the case of hazardous
pollutants, however, polluters can raise economic and technological
feasibility issues when applying for a waiver from the emission stan-
dard. 6 To date there has been no litigation attacking any hazardous
emission limitation even though feasibility issues are not excluded
from the decisionmaking process.
57
The 1977 Amendments do not change this technology-forcing as-
pect of the hazardous emission control strategy. Instead, they rein-
force the congressional desire to control hazardous air pollutants
through health considerations alone by requiring the Administrator,
within one year of enactment, to study and report on the need to
regulate cadmium, arsenic and polycyclic organic matter either under
the NPAAQS or a hazardous emission program.58 The Administrator
is also given two years to study and report on the health ramifications
of radioactive pollutants in the ambient air.5 9 The legislative history
reflects Congress' continuing concern with the necessity of regulating
health-endangering air pollutants, whether by the NPAAQS/SIP sys-
tem or through the hazardous air pollution emission program.
60
Thus, it is clear that Congress in 1977 reaffirmed its mandate that
public health be the sole factor considered in ascertaining the neces-
54. Id. at 182.
55. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 112,42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1977)).
56. Id. This is the same standard used to set the NPAAQS. Clean Air Act of
1970, § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409
(West Supp. 1977)).
57. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 112(c)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(c)(I)(B) (1970) (cur-
rently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1977)). See also S. REP.
No. 1196, supranote 8, at 20, 94-95.
58. Hazardous emission standards have been set for beryllium, mercury, asbestos,
and vinyl chloride. See4O C.F.R. § 61.01-.71 (1977).
59. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 120(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (West Supp.
1977).
60. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 3, 36-42; H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note
52, at 141-43.
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sity of regulating air pollutants. This aspect of the technology-forcing
strategy remains largely intact from the strategy created in 1970. If
anything, the courts and Congress have attempted to prod the Ad-
ministrator to do more in this area to achieve the overall purpose of
protecting the public health regardless of the feasibility of control or
any economic ramifications of the decision.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF NPAAQS (VARIANCES, EXTENSIONS AND
REVISIONS)
A. 1970Amendments
The second segment of the technology-forcing strategy involves a
fixed attainment date that cannot be easily avoided through devices
such as variances, revisions or extensions. The 1970 Amendments
made it clear that NPAAQS would have to be achieved by May 31,
1975, or as expeditiously as practicable.6 The 1970 Amendments also
61. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970) (currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a) (West Supp. 1977)).
Even though the 1970 Amendments mandated NPAAQS attainment within three
years of the Administrator's approval of the state implementation plan, the Sixth Cir-
cuit effectively eliminated that major element of the technology-forcing strategy in a
series of decisions. The court first struck down the Administrator's initial approval of
the Ohio and Kentucky SIP's because of a failure to comply with the notice and
hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Buckeye Power I, 481
F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). For a general criticism, see Kramer II, supra note 6, at 187-
88. The Administrator chose to comply with the decision rather than appealing it to
the Supreme Court and, on April 15, 1974, reapproved certain sections of the SIP that
included an attainment date for total suspended particulates of July 1, 1975. 39 Fed.
Reg. 13,539 (1974). The approval was soon challenged but was dismissed as not ripe
for review. Buckeye Power II, 525 F.2d 80, 81-82 (6th Cir. 1975). The Ohio EPA
later determined that the attainment date was "impossible" and revised it to April 15,
1977. See Northern Ohio Lung Assoc. v. EPA, No. 76-2369 (6th Cir., filed Feb. 2,
1978). Upon submission the Administrator approved the revised attainment date. 41
Fed. Reg. 41,691 (1976). It was this approval that triggered a third round of litiga-
tion, although this time the utilities were joined by an environmental group seeking
review of the new attainment date. Northern Ohio Lung Assoc. v. EPA, No. 76-2369
(6th Cir., filed Feb. 2, 1978). The Sixth Circuit followed the Union Electric mandate
by refusing to consider the utilities' argument that the attainment date was both tech-
nologically and economically infeasible. The utilities had suggested that no attain-
ment date be set for particulates until a "reasonable" and realistic date could be
established. The court rejected this argument since feasibility issues were not part of
the Administrator's review under § 110. The environmental groups, on the other
hand, argued that mid-1975 was the latest attainment date that could be recognized
under § 109 and § 110 of the 1970 Amendments. The court, utilizing a limited scope
of review as to the Administrator's decision, concluded that it was not an abuse of
discretion to delay the attainment date to three years after promulgation of the SIP.
The initial approval of the amendment, having been overturned in Buckeye , could
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limited the availability of extensions and variances by establishing
two rather complex procedural mechanisms. Under section 110(e) the
Governor of any state at the time of the original submission of the
SIP to the Administrator could request a two-year extension of the
attainment date for any NPAAQS.62 The Administrator could grant
not serve as the starting date. The court contrasted the "three years" language of §
110 with the specific calendar dates set for automobile emissions, concluding that
Congress did not intend to set mid-1975 as the final attainment date. Aiding that
finding was the court's continued reluctance to recognize the need for a hard and fast
achievement deadline to further the technology-forcing strategy. The court con-
cluded that the 1970 Amendments did not create a sudden death deadline for attain-
ment. Id. This conclusion fails to acknowledge the repeated congressional mandate
to utilize a technology-forcing strategy-a mandate that has been recognized by the
Supreme Court. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). Since an inflexible attain-
ment date is a key ingredient to the technology-forcing strategy, allowing states to
push back an attainment date merely by proposing inadequate plans is inconsistent
with the public health-protecting strategy developed by Congress. (The Ohio SIP on
resubmission did not contain a sulfur dioxide component, forcing the Administrator
to hold additional hearings to promulgate a substitute strategy. The delays in devel-
oping this strategy pushed back its promulgation date to June 17, 1977, and the attain-
ment date to June 17, 1980. 42 Fed. Reg. 27,588 (1977). In light of the 1977
Amendments the 1980 attainment date raises some interesting questions. Is Ohio a
non-attainment area for purposes of the emissions trade-off policy? Must sources
seek Delayed Compliance Orders? If they are not in compliance by July 1, 1979, can
sources be assessed Non-compliance Penalties?) The court also held that since the
SIP had not been legally approved until January 14, 1976, then June 1977 was within
the § 110(a) requirement that the SIP be attained within three years of approval by
the Administrator. Lacking any abuse of discretion and without violation of any
statutory requirement, the 1977 attainment date was upheld. Northern Ohio Lung
Assoc, v. EPA, No. 76-2369 (6th Cir., filed Feb. 2, 1978).
62. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970) (currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(e) (West Supp. 1977)). This section provides:
(e)(1) Upon application of a Governor of a State at the time of submission of
any plan implementing a national ambient air quality primary standard, the Ad-
ministrator may (subject to paragraph (2)) extend the three-year period referred
to in subsection (a)(2)(A)(i) for not more than two years for an air quality control
region if after review of such plan the Administrator determines that-
(A) one or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable
to comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary
standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available
or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance within such three-year
period, and
(B) the State has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably
available alternative means of attaining such primary standard and has justifia-
bly concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the three years
cannot be achieved.
(2) The Administrator may grant an extension under paragraph (1) only if he
determines that the State plan provides for-
(A) application of the requirements of the plan which implement such pri-
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the extension only after making several difficult determinations.63 A
section 1 10(e) extension would not apply directly to individual
sources, but would allow an additional two-year period for the SIP to
meet the NPAAQS. Several section 110(e) extensions have been
granted, and further use of section 110(e) for newly-promulgated
NPAAQS, such as lead, is still possible.
The only explicit individual source variance mechanism created by
the 1970 Amendments was contained in section 1 10(f).6 The Admin-
mary standard to all emission sources in such region other than the sources (or
classes) described in paragraph (1)(A) within the three-year period, and
(B) such interim measures of control of the sources (or classes) described in
paragraph (1)(a) as the Administrator determines to be reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.
This mechanism would apply only to newly designated NPAAQS pollutants such as
lead.
63. Seenote 62 supra
64. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). This section
provided in part:
(f)(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving
sources is required to comply with any requirement of any applicable implemen-
tation plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to
the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such
source (or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines
that-
(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirements
before such date,
(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because
the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not avail-
able or have not been available for a sufficient period of time,
(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim control meas-
ures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and
(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or
to the public health or welfare, then the Administrator shall grant a postpone-
ment of such requirement.
(2)(A) Any determination under paragraph (1) shall (i) be made on the rec-
ord after notice to interested persons and opportunity for hearing, (ii) be based
upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearings, and (iii) include a
statement setting forth in detail the findings and conclusions upon which the de-
termination is based.
(B) Any determination made pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to
judicial review by the United States court of appeals for the circuit which in-
cludes such State upon the filing in such court within 30 days from the date of
such decision of a petition by any interested person praying that the decision be
modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of the petition shall forthwith
be sent by registered or certified mail to the Administrator and thereupon the
Administrator shall certify and file in such court the record upon which the final
decision complained of was issued, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United
States Code. Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction to
affirm, or set aside the determination complained of in whole or in part. The
findings of the Administrator with respect to questions of fact (including each
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istrator could grant the section 110(f) extension only on the request of
the Governor of the state in which the source was located, and not
upon request of the individual polluter. In addition, the Administra-
tor could grant the extension only after holding an adjudicatory-type
hearing and making several specific findings.65 Feasibility was only
one of four findings required before a section 110(f) variance could
be granted.66 Variances were limited to a one-year period.
Because of a perceived lack of responsiveness of the section 110(f)
mechanism to the needs of industrial polluters, it has never been uti-
lized. Instead, states and the EPA began to grant individual variances
from approved SIP's without utilizing section 110(f).67 The EPA's po-
sition was that variances were "revisions" of an SIP under section
I I0(a), thus requiring EPA approval prior to their becoming effec-
tive. However, under section 110(a) the EPA could approve a revi-
sion without holding the adjudicatory hearings required under
section 10(e) or (f).68 In implementing this variance program,
neither the EPA nor the states made any crucial distinction between
variances that threatened attainment of the health-based NPAAQS
within three years and those which did not.
The circuit courts, in a series of decisions, reached several different
positions on this variance issue. The First Circuit utilized the attain-
ment date as a dividing point between variances that could be
granted only under section 110(f) and those that could be treated as
determination made under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of paragraph (I))
shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such
hearing.
(C) Proceedings before the court under this paragraph shall take precedence
over all the other causes of action on the docket and shall be assigned for hearing
and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
(D) Section 307(a) (relating to subpoenas) shall be applicable to any proceed-
ing under this subsection.
Section 110() has been repealed by the 1977 Amendments. Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 107(a), 91 Stat. 691 (1977). SeegenerallKramer
I, supra note 3, at 73-76.
65. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(f, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). The necessity
of an adjudicatory hearing is evoked because Congress utilized the magic words of
rulemaking "on the record." The use of those words brings the proceedings under
the adjudicatory hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970). It also entails a more stringent scope of judicial review utilizing the
substantial evidence test. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971).
66. See note 64 supra
67. See Kramer I, supra note 3, at 82-95.
68. Id
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revisions under section 110(a).69 The Fifth Circuit required that all
variances granted by the states utilize the section 110(f) process.7"
Only the Ninth Circuit correctly saw the distinction between those
variances that threatened attainment and those that did not.
7
'
The issue reached the Supreme Court in Train v. NRDC,72 on ap-
peal from the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court had based its disap-
proval of the EPA's evasion of section 10(f) on the technology-
forcing strategy of the 1970 Amendments.7" The Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit decision, but at the same time clearly af-
firmed the congressional mandate of a technology-forcing strategy
for stationary sources. The Court immediately recognized the
mandatory three-year attainment period as "the heart of the 1970
Amendments."74 In addition, the Court recognized the limited
"safety-valve" nature of both the section 10(e) extension and the
section 110(f) variance.75 The reason for the reversal was a limiting
interpretation the Court gave to the revision authority under section
110(a). As the Court construed the statute, variances granted under
the revision authority would not be valid unless the SIP, after revi-
sion, would still meet the section 110 mandate of NPAAQS attain-
ment by May 31, 1975. Thus, variances could be granted by the state
with EPA approval under section 110(a) only if they did not individ-
ually or collectively preclude attainment of the NPAAQS. For all at-
tainment-endangering changes, section 110(f) would provide the only
recourse. For variances not threatening attainment the technology-
forcing mandate was not applicable, since the 1970 Amendments
were not intended to force technological development beyond that
necessary to achieve NPAAQS.76
69. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 885-88 (lst
Cir. 1973). Accor4 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519,
523 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690,
693-94 (8th Cir. 1973).
70. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 402-03 (5th
Cir. 1974), rev'dsub non Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S.
60 (1975).
71. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 916 (9th Cir.
1974).
72. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
73. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 402-03 (5th
Cir. 1974).
74. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1975).
75. Id at 81.
76. 1d at 90-92.
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Thus, after Train, a bifurcated system for granting variances
should have been instituted. For non-attainment areas individual
sources could not be granted variances without utilizing the section
110(f) mechanism. This was consonant with the technology-forcing
strategy. For variances that would not threaten attainment of
NPAAQS, the technology-forcing strategy was not applicable and
therefore states could, at their discretion, issue such individual vari-
ances provided the EPA viewed them as a revision of an already-
approved SIP.
In addition to the section 110(e) and 110(f) processes, extensions
could be granted through compliance orders issued under enforce-
ment powers granted the EPA and the states.77 Section 113 allowed
the EPA to issue compliance orders specifying a "reasonable" time
for compliance as an alternative remedy in cases where sources were
in violation of an approved SIP.7 Section 113 compliance orders
have illegally allowed individual sources to extend their dates of
compliance far beyond the mandatory attainment date of 1975 or
1977." 9 These compliance orders are invalid since, in most cases, they
77. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. 1977)). Section 113 provides in part:
(a)(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Ad-
mmistrator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of any appli-
cable implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation
of the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such viola-
tion extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notifica-
tion, the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with
the requirements of such plan or he may bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b)....
(4) An order issued under this subsection (other than an order relating to a
violation of section 112) shall not take effect until the person to whom it is issued
has had an opportunity to confer with the Administrator concerning the alleged
violation. A copy of any order issued under this subsection shall be sent to the
State air pollution control agency of any State in which the violation occurs.
Any order issued under this subsection shall state with reasonable specificity the
nature of the violation, specify a time for compliance which the Administrator
determines is reasonable, taking into account the seriousness of the violation and
any good faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements. In any case in
which an order under this subsection (or notice to a violator under paragraph (1))
is issued to a corporation, a copy of such order (or notice) shall be issued to
appropriate corporate officers.
Section 110 also allowed the states to extend compliance schedules in order to achieve
mandated levels of emissions. These are not really extensions because they could not
extend beyond the attainment date.
78. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970) (currently codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(a)(1) (West Supp. (1977)).
79. See, e.g, [1974] 5 ENVIR. RaP. (BNA) 1097-98 (allowing Philadelphia Electric
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are inconsistent with the legislative mandate requiring SIP's to attain
and maintain the NPAAQS within the designated time period. 0 The
use of compliance orders to extend the deadlines is contradictory to
the technology-forcing strategy. They have undoubtedly been utilized
for large numbers of major sources that would have otherwise sought
relief under section 110(f). Finally, section 110 authorized the inclu-
sion in SIP's of schedules of compliance as a means to obtain
NPAAQS. s' These schedules, like section 113 compliance orders,
could not legally extend beyond the mandated attainment date.
Thus, while the 1970 Amendments were quite specific in limiting
the availability of extensions, variances, and revisions to effectuate
the technology-forcing strategy, it was apparent from the outset that
the EPA and the states were trying to circumvent those limitations.
The "all-or-nothing" approach was not readily acceptable to state
and local officials, especially when applied to major sources of pollu-
tion that also happened to be major sources of employment and
taxes. States sought, on economic and technological grounds, to allow
individual sources to pollute even though violations of NPAAQS
would result. The shutdown alternative was simply unacceptable to
many regions of the country that by mid-1975 had not achieved the
NPAAQS for the five named pollutants.8 2
B. The 1977 Amendments
The congressional program created by the 1970 Amendments was
a relatively simple, if not palatable, process for polluters. The alterna-
tives allowed were few in number and in most cases the prerequisites
to the granting of extensions, variances, and revisions were specifi-
cally enumerated in the statute.8 3 Little administrative latitude or dis-
Co. to delay final compliance until 1978). See also [1975] 6 ENvIR. REP.(BNA) 1298;
[1974] 5 ENviR. R P. (BNA) 1303.
80. S. REP. No. 127, supranote 5, at 45, flatly declares: "This procedure has no
basis in law. The only authority for extended deadlines is section 110(1)."
81. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970) (cur-
rently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1977)).
82. EPA, STATE AIR POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (1975).
83. Seenotes 61-81 and accompanying text supra The fact that many states, pol-
luters and courts refused to accept the technology-forcing strategy and its exclusion of
economic, technological and social issues does not detract from the basic simplicity of
the process. For a general description of the workings of the 1977 Amendments, see
Skillern, Environmental Law Issues in the Development of Energy Resourceg 29 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 739, 755-72 (1977).
The reality of non-attainment also created the problem of economic stagnation for
such areas. Since shutdown of existing plants was the only alternative left to the
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cretion was allowed: the NPAAQS had to be achieved by 1975. The
1977 Amendments replace this simple but unworkable system with a
more complex series of programs designed to maintain the overall
technology-forcing strategy while acknowledging the realities of non-
attainment.
1. Mandatory Attainment Dates
The 1977 Amendments eliminate the prior confusion concerning
the distinction between attainment and non-attainment areas. Under
the new statute, all AQCR's in the nation must have been classified
as either an attainment or non-attainment area within 120 days of
August 7, 1977.84 For all areas classified as non-attainment for any of
the five named pollutants, a new strategy has been devised to avoid
the massive shutdowns that would have taken place under the 1970
Amendments.85 In effect, the 1977 Amendments push back the
states after failing to attain the NPAAQS, it became obvious that new sources of air
pollution would not be allowed to develop in these non-attainment areas. The EPA
responded to this dilemma in December 1976 by creating the so-called "emissions
trade-off policy." 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976). Through this Interpretive Ruling the
EPA hoped to allow continued new economic development in the non-attainment
areas. The ruling placed several stringent conditions on the granting of a permit for
any major source of pollutants in an area where the NPAAQS had not been achieved.
Id at 55,528. The new source would have to utilize the lowest achievable emission
rate (LAER) for its particular source classification. This was defined to be the lowest
emission rate achieved in practice, but could never exceed the limits set by New
Source Performance Standards. Id at 55,526. Second, the owner or operator of the
proposed source must certify that all existing sources owned or controlled within the
same AQCR are in compliance with applicable SIP requirements or are otherwise in
compliance with an enforcement order issued under § 113. Third, emission reduc-
tions or offsets from existing sources in the area are required such that the total emis-
sions from the existing and proposed sources do not exceed total emissions prior to
the request to construct. These offsets must be of the same pollutant, thus, for exam-
ple, a trade-off of carbon monoxide for sulfur dioxide emissions is not allowed. Id at
55,528-9. These emission offsets must provide a net ambient air quality benefit, not
merely a maintenance of the status quo in ambient air quality. In areas where the
NPAAQS is not achievable under the approved SIP and a major revision is required
in order to attain the NPAAQS, no new construction permits can be granted until the
EPA has approved the SIP revision. Certain exemptions are made from the require-
ments where the lack of adequate fuel supplies is the cause of increased emissions.
Id at 55,529. The 1977 Amendments endorse, with certain changes, the EPA's emis-
sion offset policy as controlling development in non-attainment areas until July 1,
1979. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(a), 91 Stat. 745
(1977). After July 1, 1979, the 1977 Amendments will take over the problem of non-
attainment areas. Seenotes 93-98 and accompanying text infra
84. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 103,42 U.S.C.A. § 7407(d) (West Supp.
1977).
85. Attainment areas fall under a program to prevent significant deterioration.
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mandatory attainment date for non-attainment areas to December
31, 1982, or as expeditiously as practicable.86 States must prepare and
submit to the EPA by July 1, 1979, a revised SIP ensuring attainment
by December 31, 1982. A penalty is imposed for failure to submit an
effective SIP. No state will be allowed to license any new or modified
major stationary sources of pollution in a non-attainment area after
July 1, 1979, without an approved SIP. 7 In cases where the AQCR
has not attained the NPAAQS for carbon monoxide or photochemi-
cal oxidants, a further delay to December 31, 1987, can be granted by
the Administrator."8
This extension obviously compromises the original technology-
forcing strategy. But the legislative history of the 1977 Amendments
reaffirms Congress' commitment to protect the public health despite
the large economic costs involved, 89 and several new provisions actu-
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 127(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7470-79 (West Supp.
1977). This neat division into attainment and non-attainment areas does not simplify
the problem of pre-construction stationary source review, since there is the complicat-
ing factor involving transportation of air pollutants in the ambient air. Thus, a
source attempting to locate in an attainment area may threaten attainment of an
NPAAQS in a non-attainment area. The EPA draft regulations attempting to imple-
ment Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and non-attainment area pro-
grams has recognized this problem. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 932. It is the
current EPA policy to review all new major stationary sources for their impact on
both attainment and non-attainment areas regardless of location. [1977] 8 ENVIR.
REp. (BNA) 1109-11. The EPA, however, plans to exempt from PSD review all new
stationary sources in non-attainment areas because the Lowest Achievable Emission
Rate (LAER) requirements for non-attainment areas are more stringent than the PSD
requirement of best available control technology. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,226 (1977) (to be
codified in 40 C.F.R. § 432).
86. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1978).
87. Id
88. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1977). The rationale for the further extension available for photochemical oxi-
dants and carbon monoxide, since they are basically automobile-caused pollutants, is
that the easing of motor vehicle standards would make attainment by 1982 impossi-
ble. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 201(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West Supp.
1977).
89. S. REP. No. 127, supranote 5, at 17-18. See alsoH.R. REP. No. 294, supranote
52, which declared:
The provision of law (non-attainment) coupled with the fact that a substantial
number of regions had not attained one or more of the standards on time posed a
dilemma for the committee. On the one hand, protection of the public health
remains the predominant goal of the Clean A/r Act and the Committee
.. . On the other hand, a complete prohibition on new growth and expansion in
non-attainment areas would pose very serious problems.
Id at 208-10 (emphasis added).
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ally reinforce the strategy. Setting a definite deadline emphasizes to
the courts and to polluters the necessity of developing a technology
that will allow achievement of the NPAAQS by the attainment
date.' It will not take another six-year round of litigation to decide
that SIP's must be designed to meet the target date regardless of eco-
nomic, social or technological factors.9 ' It is also a warning to pol-
luters that further litigation will not lead to additional court-imposed
delays. Again, shutdown of polluting facilities would be mandated in
1982 if attainment is not achieved. The addition of a penalty for fail-
ure to submit a revised SIP will undoubtedly overcome the reluctance
of the states to make the difficult decisions necessary to attain
NPAAQS.
By moving the attainment deadline back to 1982 and the SIP dead-
line back to 1979, the 1977 Amendments created an interim period
between 1977 and 1979 that had to be dealt with. The EPA already
had promulgated its own "emissions offset" policy for non-attain-
ment areas.92 The Conference Committee adhered very closely to the
EPA's Interpretive Ruling for the interim period,93 but made one im-
portant change dealing with the baseline level of pollutants from
which the offsets were measured. Under the Interpretive Ruling, the
baseline normally would be the level called for in the approved SIP.
90. Compare S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1977) with Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(a) (West Supp. 1977). See also H.R.
REP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 155-58. The proposed legislation in 1976 would not
have been as satisfactory as the 1977 Amendments because of their limited perspec-
tive. Development in non-attainment areas was allowed only where the developer
could show no net increase in emissions from the proposed facility location. This
would restrict the area in which offsets could be achieved. See S. REP. No. 717, supra
note 47, at 41-44; H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 177-81. The 1976 Amend-
ments would have required that the proposed new or modified facility utilize best
available control technology (BACT), which considers energy, environmental and ec-
onomic impacts and other costs in determining what technology is achievable for such
a facility. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 123 (1976) as reported in H.R. REP. No.
1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1742]. The
outermost limit would have been the new source performance standard under § I 11.
Id The definition of LAER contained in the 1977 Amendments is more restrictive
than BACT, and places the burden of proof on the polluter to show that the emission
limitation is not achievable. CompareS. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1976) and
H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 115 (1976) with Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7501 (West Supp. 1977).
91. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). See generallyKramer II, note 6
supra.
92. See note 83 supra
93. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(a), 91 Stat. 745
(1977).
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However, because a number of SIP's were substantially inadequate to
meet the mandatory attainment dates, the EPA ruled that for those
areas the baseline would be emission limitations representing the rea-
sonably available control measures that would be contained within
the required revisions of the SIP's.94 , The 1977 Amendments weak-
ened this baseline limitation by defining it to be "the applicable im-
plementation plan of the state in effect at the time of application for a
permit by a proposed major stationary source. . . ."91 If the applica-
ble SIP does not attain NPAAQS, it follows that the total amount of
pollutants allowed will be greater than under the required revision.
Thus, offsets from this larger total will be easier to achieve than if the
baseline were set at the revised SIP total. This creates an incentive for
the states to delay submitting SIP's until the last minute so as to allow
offsets up to 1979.96 Yet, it was just such lacklustre state concern with
air pollution control that Congress hoped to remedy through the 1977
Amendments.
The 1977 Amendments also set out the requirements for a waiver
from this interim offset policy.97 The Administrator can grant a
waiver with respect to any pollutant if he determines that the state
has an inventory of emissions for each non-attainment area that iden-
tifies the type, quantity and source of such pollutant. He must also
determine that the state has an enforceable permit program that re-
quires new or modified major stationary sources to meet emission
limitations at least as stringent as those required for the 1979-1982
SIP. The permit program must require existing sources to achieve
such emission reductions as may be obtained through the use of rea-
sonably available control technology. The state program must also
contain a reduction in total allowable emissions prior to 1979 so as to
provide the same level of emission reduction that would result from
application of the offset regulation.9" The difficulty of obtaining this
94. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,526 (1976).
95. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(a), 91 Stat. 745
(1977).
96. The conference report sheds no light on why Congress refused to go along with
this part of the EPA's Interpretive Ruling. H.R. RnP. No. 564, supranote 52, at 157.
97. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(a), 91 Stat. 745
(1977).
98. Id Texas has been the only state to submit an application to waive the offset
policy requirements. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 857. The Administrator rejected
the application, saying that it was insufficient in many areas. Id. at 1238. Texas is
facing a cut-off of EPA funds for its air pollution program because of its failure to
implement the offset policy.
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waiver will undoubtedly preclude its widespread use before the 1979
submittal date.
Because of the new requirements for waivers and suspensions, the
revised 1979 SIP's will necessarily include several provisions not
mandated by the 1970 Amendments. The 1977 Amendments require
that all reasonably available control measures be provided as expedi-
tiously as possible.9 9 Furthermore, states will not have the option of
postponing until the 1982 attainment date any necessary emission
limitations, because of the requirement that the SIP achieve "reason-
able further progress" in the interim pre-attainment date period."°°
Reasonable further progress is defined to mean "annual incremental
reductions in emissions. . . which are sufficient in the judgment of
the Administrator" to meet the mandatory attainment date.10' This
requirement was clearly intended to prevent deferral until the end of
the pre-attainment period the more difficult emission reductions that
might complicate or render impossible timely attainment of stand-
ards.' 02
One perceived weakness of the 1970 Amendments was the lack of
public and local government participation in air pollution deci-
sions.' 03 Thus, an avowed purpose of the 1977 Amendments was to
increase the involvement of state and local governments and the pub-
lic in determining how best to achieve the health-based standards.1 4
To this end, the newest amendments require that a revised SIP be the
product of cooperative consultation between state and local govern-
99. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1977).
100. Id § 7502(b)(3).
101. Id § 7501(1).
102. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 212-23. The House bill originally re-
quired equal reductions over two-year periods leading up to the attainment date.
H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 117 (1977). The Senate bill had no requirement of
reasonable further progress. S. 252, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 13 (1977). The Confer-
ence Committee acceded to the House requirement of progress but deleted the two-
year period strategy. H.R. REP. No. 564, supranote 52, at 158. The clear intent of the
requirement was to avoid the last minute parade of horrors or shutdowns that had
occurred in 1975 after the SIP's had deferred compliance until the last possible mo-
ment. Id
103. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7502(b)(9),
7504 (West Supp. 1977). See also H.R. RP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 156.
104. H.R. REP. No. 294, supranote 52, at 1, 213-14. S. RP. No. 127, supranote 5,
at 2, states: "As with the 1976 Amendments, the legislation intends to strengthen the
capability of that level of government most closely associated with an air pollution
problem to deal with that problem."
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ments. °5 Further, the SIP must identify and analyze the air quality,
health, welfare, economic, energy, and social effects of the plan's pro-
visions as well as list the alternatives considered and rejected by the
state. This information then must be made available for public com-
ment.
0 6
In another innovation, the 1979 SIP's must also contain an enforce-
able permit program requiring all new or modified major stationary
sources in non-attainment areas to utilize Lowest Achievable Emis-
sion Rates (LAER).' °7 Polluters are thus required to install the latest
pollution control devices, even if they consider such devices unrea-
sonable, if they wish to develop in the nation's non-attainment areas.
LAER is intended to impose a more stringent requirement than those
contained in the new source performance standards (NSPS) issued by
the EPA under section 111.108 In determining LAER, cost is to be
given less weight than in the determination of NSPS. 10 9 Only in cases
where the cost of any given technology is so great as to totally pre-
clude construction of a major stationary source would cost factors
prevail over public health considerations. 011 This additional require-
ment for new or modified sources again makes it clear that cost con-
siderations are secondary in decisions regarding the trade-offs
between clean air and economic growth. It provides a further incen-
tive for industry to develop less costly and more effective emission
control devices.
Thus, the 1977 Amendments retain the basic structure of the 1970
Amendments insofar as they require attainment by a certain date.
105. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7502(b)(9),
7504 (West Supp. 1977).
106. Id. § 7502(b)(9).
107. Id. §§ 7501, 7502(b)(6), 7503.
108. H.R. REp. No. 564, sufpra note 52, at 11.
109. d. at 215. The House Report, in describing the House version finally ac-
cepted by the Conference, said this about LAER:
However, in light of the adverse air quality and health consequences of this new
pollution, the committee concluded that all feasible efforts to reduce or control
this new pollution should be mandated.
Furthermore, maximum pollution control from new sources is necessary in order
to permit room for maximum potential economic growth. This is particularly
true in light of the requirement for reasonable further progress and the indica-
tions that emissions from many existing sources in non-attainment areas will be
increasing. . . . Finally the technology-forcing purpose of the act is best served
by requiring maximum feasible pollution control from these new sources in dirty
air areas.
Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id See also H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 157.
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New SIP requirements were added because of the difficult problems
of attainment. Yet the original strategy, although bending in the
winds of change, did not give way entirely.
2. Variances, Revisions and Extensions
As previously discussed, the section 110(f) mechanism for granting
individual variances was unworkable. Yet after Train it was impossi-
ble to grant a variance that endangered attainment of an NPAAQS
without using section 110(f). 11 An individual source variance in a
non-attainment area could not be granted merely by revising the SIP.
The Administrator's practice of using section 113 enforcement au-
thority to approve compliance schedules extending beyond the
attainment date was criticized as being blatantly illegal." 
2
Substantial dissatisfaction with the variance and revision policy led
to the passage of several different programs to replace the section
110(f) mechanism, whereby individual sources could receive vari-
ances from approved SIP's.
a. Temporary Emergency Suspensions (TES)
The "energy crisis," along with high inflation and high unemploy-
ment, was the stimulus for the development of a new kind of individ-
ual variance from the application of an SIP." 3 Out of the severe
winter of 1976-77 came a demand for some type of temporary vari-
ance or exception for sources that primarily utilized clean-burning
natural gas but whose supplies had been curtailed to serve higher
priority customers. The result was a last minute amendment to the
House bill in 1976 that allowed Governors to issue Temporary Emer-
gency Suspensions (TES).' 4 A TES grants a fuel-burning stationary
source relief from the operation of an approved SIP for a maximum
I l I. See notes 64-76 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 80 supra.
113. The energy crisis of 1974, by greatly increasing the demand for coal-fired
electrical generating plants, triggered air pollution problems not associated with
clean-burning natural gas or oil electrical generating plants. Congress reacted by
passing the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-98 (Supp. IV 1974). ESECA basically allowed the Administrator to waive any
applicable SIP emission standard for a fuel-burning source unable to comply because
of a lack of availability for certain fuels such as natural gas or low sulfur coal. 15
U.S.C. § 792 (Supp. IV 1974). That portion of ESECA which modified the 1970
Amendments was repealed in 1977. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, § 112(b)(1), 91 Stat. 709 (1977).
114. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 12-13.
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of four months.1 15
The 1977 Amendments identify two situations in which a TES can
be utilized. The section 110(e) TES is drawn principally from the
original House version.116 A Governor's issuance of a TES must be
preceded by a Presidential determination that a national or regional
emergency energy or employment crisis exists.' 17 As originally pro-
posed in the House bill, a TES could be issued by the Governor
alone upon request by any stationary source for relief from the oper-
ation of the approved SIP for either energy or economic reasons.118
The requirement of a Presidential determination was added out of a
fear that liberal use of TES authority by Governors more interested
in economic problems and reelection concerns than in adverse health
effects of air pollution could destroy the technology-forcing strategy
of the SIP, especially in non-attainment areas. A Governor's issuance
of a TES must also be preceded by a public hearing and based upon a
finding that there exists in the vicinity of the source a temporary en-
ergy emergency involving high levels of unemployment or loss of res-
idential energy supplies that could be "totally or partially alleviated"
by the TES.1 9 The Governor may not issue a TES where the SIP is
federally promulgated. 120 This provides an additional incentive for
states to submit realistic technology-forcing SIP's that meet the pri-
mary criteria of attaining the NPAAQS by the mandated date. Where
an SIP has been federally promulgated the President may grant a
TES, once he makes the same findings as a Governor would be re-
quired to make.121
Prior approval by the EPA is not required before a TES becomes
effective although the Administrator can, through the issuance of a
disapproval order, suspend the effectiveness of the TES. However,
adminstrative review of the TES is limited to a determination of
whether the Governor made proper findings as to the existence of a
115. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410()(3) (West
Supp. 1977).
116. Id See H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115 (1977).
117. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410()(3) (West
Supp. 1977).
118. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115 (1977).
119. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(0(2) (West
Supp. 1977).
120. Id § 7410(0(4). The 1977 Amendments allow the Administrator to prepare
and publish an SIP if the state either fails to submit its own SIP, or submits a plan not
in accordance with the Clean Air Act's SIP requirements. Id § 7410(a), (c).
121. Id § 7410(f)(4).
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requisite energy crisis and the ability of the TES to alleviate the
emergency.122 Thus, the effect of the TES on the attainment plan can-
not be considered by the Administrator. This narrow scope of review
represents a departure from the original House bill, which would
have authorized review to determine if the TES complied with sec-
tion 1 10(a)(2). 23 It is not clear whether this reference in the House
bill was a mistake or if the Conference Committee intentionally
made the change, but the result allows the use of a TES to possibly
delay attainment or permit violation of the NPAAQS. This indicates
a further erosion of the technology-forcing strategy.
The 1977 Amendments also created a second form of TES in-
tended to deal with the specific problem of plant closures due to strin-
gent SIP requirements. 124 This section 10(g) TES can be utilized
only if the state has submitted a revised SIP that has been neither
approved nor disapproved by the Administrator within the mandated
four month period. 25 The revised SIP must meet the requirements of
section 110 and demonstrate that a revision is necessary to prevent
the closing, for one year or more, of a source of air pollution, and that
substantial increases in unemployment would result from such clos-
ing. 126 If the Administrator has not acted upon the requested revision
within the required period, the Governor may issue a section 110(g)
TES effective for a maximum of four months. The TES would have
the effect of excusing the source from compliance with the current
SIP emissions limitations, and imposing the proposed limitations un-
til final federal approval or disapproval. This would insulate the
source from citizen suits under section 304 for violation of an emis-
sion standard during the federal review process. 127 Unlike the section
110(f) TES, the issuance of a section 110(g) TES would probably not
impair attainment by the mandatory date since the 110(g) TES can be
issued only if the proposed SIP revision still targets attainment of the
NPAAQS by the deadline. The Administrator can shorten the four
month duration of the section 110(g) TES by issuing a disapproval
notice if he determines that the TES does not meet the requirements
122. Id § 7410(0(3).
123. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 115 (1977).
124. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(g) (West
Supp. 1977).
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 7410(g)(1)(B).
127. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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of an NPAAQS-attainable SIP and the probability of a plant closing
unless the revision is approved.
128
These TES provisions contain certain safeguards designed to limit
the ability of Governors to issue wholesale TES's as a means of
avoiding the harsh technology-forcing character of an SIP. The
House Report had specifically declared that the TES authority was to
be sparingly used-that TES's were not intended to be a "chronic
circumvention of the Act's requirements."' 29 For long-term problems
states were given other, more structured options also subject to re-
view by the Administrator. 3 ' The House would have prohibited the
use of consecutive TES's for the same "crisis."'' For any individual
source to receive two suspensions it would have to adduce a second
set of facts that would allow the Governor to make two separate and
independent findings of emergency. The TES provisions requiring
mandatory gubernatorial findings, review by the Administrator, a
short four-month duration, and the ban on consecutive TES's for the
same crisis all indicate congressional concern toward safeguarding
the technology-forcing strategy. Nonetheless, the TES represents two
new types of variances that weaken the overall strategy. Although the
section 110(g) TES is somewhat limited and in no case can it prevent
attainment of the NPAAQS, the section 110(f) TES is especially wor-
risome because it allows the NPAAQS to be violated for economic
reasons.
b. Primary Non-Ferrous Smelter Orders (PNSO's)
In addition to responding to perceived national crises in unemploy-
ment and energy, Congress created a specialized type of variance
provision for the primary non-ferrous smelter industry, an industry
128. The legislative history of this section is unclear. The House bill was very
similar to what eventually became § 110(t) but there was no comparable version al-
lowing a separate TES made necessary by delays in the administrative review process.
Compare H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115 (1977) with Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(g) (West Supp. 1977). The Conference
Committee Report merely notes that the Senate amended the House version by re-
stricting the Governors' economic TES powers to this limited situation. H.R. Rn.
No. 564, supranote 52, at 125. The House version had a combined energy and eco-
nomic TES with similar requirements. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(1977).
129. H.R. REP. No. 294, supranote 52, at 203.
130. Delayed compliance orders under § 121 of the House bill were cited as an
example of these long-term variance provisions. Id
131. Again, the House Report made it clear that the Governor must use the TES
authority judiciously and only under considerations of "substantial hardship" that
could be traced directly to the SIP requirements. Id
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which has a long history of fighting emission standards on grounds of
technological and economic infeasibility.' 32 In fact, the battle to con-
trol smelter industry emissions is the archetype of the technology-
forcing strategy's failure to stimulate needed technological develop-
ment by the mandated attainment date. It represents an admission by
Congress that the technology-forcing strategy can be compromised if
the targeted industry fights the standards rather than developing the
new technology-in effect betting that the government will not keep
its shutdown promise.
The primary non-ferrous smelter industry has long complained
that retrofitting its existing plants to achieve a substantial diminution
in sulfur dioxide emissions is both technologically impossible and ec-
onomically infeasible.' 33 The industry proposed using only supple-
mentary control systems (SCS) that do not limit stack gas emissions
of sulfur dioxide, but rather attempt to minimize the deleterious ef-
fect on the ambient air quality through various dispersion enhance-
ment techniques.
The House and the Senate in both 1976 and 1977 took differing
views in this area, with the House approach prevailing in both the
1976 Conference Committee and the Amendments as enacted.13 4 The
1976 House bill attempted to deal directly with the problems of pri-
mary non-ferrous smelters by granting them the right to seek up to
two five-year compliance date extensions. 135 The House Report re-
flects congressional concern over some particularly difficult economic
and technological questions in the area of constant emission reduc-
tion systems for existing and new primary non-ferrous smelters.
136
The 1977 House bill also treated PNSO's as a special type of
delayed compliance order.'37 Smelters in existence at the time of the
enactment of the 1977 Amendments could seek extensions of an
132. See, e.g, Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, I1 E.R.C. 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bunker Hill
Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearing denied 11 E.R.C. 1204 (9th Cir.
1977); Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S.
935 (1976); Kennecott Copper v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Nev. 1976).
133. See cases cited note 132 supra. See also 1974 Oversight Hearings, supra note
44, pt. I at 239-77 (statement of Frank Milliken, President of Kennecott Copper Co.);
id pt. 2 at 1382-85 (statement of American Smelting and Refining Co.).
134. Compare S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 117 (1976) with H.R. 6161, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1977) andClean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 117(b), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7419 (West Supp. 1977).
135. H.R 10498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1975).
136. H.R. REP. No. 1175, supranote 47, at 44-46.
137. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1977).
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otherwise applicable emission standard for sulfur dioxide through
January 1, 1983.138 A second extension was possible through January
1, 1988.13' The PNSO would be available if the smelter was unable to
comply because no system of continuous emission limitation had
been "adequately demonstrated to be reasonably available."' 40
The 1977 Amendments, reflecting the House approach, treat non-
ferrous smelters as a specialized problem.' Existing non-ferrous
smelters are eligible for two five-year PNSO's, the first extending to
1983, and the second to 1988.142 The PNSO can be issued by the
Administrator or by the state, although the state-issued PNSO will
not become effective until the Administrator determines that the or-
der was issued in accordance with the statutory requirements. 143
PNSO's can be issued for existing smelters that are unable to comply
with the requirement of an approved SIP for sulfur dioxide emission
because no adequate technology has been demonstrated to be reason-
ably available.'" The initial PNSO may be issued without notice or
public hearing except where the Administrator has disapproved a
state-issued PNSO, or where the smelter is seeking a waiver from all
constant emission control requirements in order to avoid cessation of
activities.'45 All PNSO's must contain interim control measures to
assure attainment and maintenance of NPAAQS and national secon-
dary standards during the duration of the PNSO. 146 These interim
measures must include compliance with reporting and monitoring re-
quirements and such other measures that the Administrator deems
"necessary to avoid an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the health of persons."' 47 In addition, smelters must utilize continu-
ous emission control systems. However, a smelter may obtain a




141. Compare H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 137-38 with Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, § 117(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7419 (West Supp. 1977).
142. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 117(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7419 (West
Supp. 1977).
143. Id. § 7419(a)(1)(A)-(B). A polluter has the option of applying for a PNSO or
a § 113(d) Delayed Compliance Order, but not both.
144. Id. § 7419(b)(1)-(3).
145. Id § 7419. See also H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 138.
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ministrator determines that compliance would be so costly as to cause
a temporary or long-term cessation of operations.' 48
The 1977 Amendments also retained the Administrator's authority
to bring an enforcement action, revoke the PNSO, or give notice of
non-compliance for purposes of imposing a non-compliance penalty
for the violation of any requirement of the PNSO including threaten-
ing attainment or maintenance of a NPAAQS. 149
The problem with primary non-ferrous smelters is the paradigm
case of the battle between clean air and economic or technological
feasibility. In this case the Administrator had concluded that the costs
of technically proven control systems for existing and new smelters
were so great that they could not be absorbed or passed on without
causing mine closings, loss of sales, and substitution of foreign im-
ports not hampered by pollution control requirements. 50 Under the
technology-forcing strategy shutdown would be required in any case
where the smelter would cause a violation of NPAAQS. The House
version of the bill apparently would have avoided shutdown but
would have allowed enforcement actions in the event of violations of
NPAAQS caused by a confluence of several factors, including in-
creased production and emissions, atmospheric conditions, and
others. The Senate version was less precise in demanding attainment
of the NPAAQS as a prerequisite to issuance of a PNSO.' 51 Since the
1977 Amendments primarily relied on the House version of the
PNSO strategy, the legislative history of the House bill is a strong
148. Id.
149. Id. § 7419(f). This language was taken directly from the House bill. H.R.
6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1977). See also H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at
61-62.
150. H.R. REP. No. 294, note 52 supra.
151. The 1976 Senate bill authorized an SIP to contain Supplementary Control
Systems for existing primary non-ferrous smelters where they were enforceable and
would not hinder attainment of the NPAAQS. See S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §
117 (1976). However, the 1976 Senate Report indicates that SCS were to be strictly
supplementary, implying that continuous emission standards were to be imposed and
attained before SCS could be utilized. S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 152. The
Senate Committee also emphasized the need for further industry and government
research to develop a feasible constant emission technology, thereby endorsing the
EPA's requirement that the polluter commit resources for research in this area before
any SCS would be allowed. Id This requirement of private on-going research was
accepted by the Ninth Circuit as a valid condition for a variance or compliance order.
See Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1975). The 1977 Senate
bill took essentially the same approach. See S. REP. No. 127, supranote 5. Since
the SCS provision was made a part of the SIP process, the use of SCS could never
threaten the attainment or maintenance of NPAAQS. Id at 24-25, 144.
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indication that Congress did not intend to diminish its mandate to
achieve the NPAAQS even at great cost.' 52 The House Report stated:
"Attainment and maintenance of the national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards would be required at all times under
this provision." '153 The PNSO reaffirms the Train finding that Con-
gress did not intend to mandate a technology-forcing strategy where
the NPAAQS were already attained and the public health protected.
Thus Congress has given smelters a specialized exemption only when
they are located in an area that is not in violation of any NPAAQS or
secondary standard.
c. Innovative Technology Waivers (ITW)
Under the 1970 Amendments all new stationary sources of air pol-
lution were directly controlled by the EPA through the development
of new source performance standards (NSPS).'5 4 NSPS were
designed to require the use of the best adequately demonstrated tech-
nology.15 5 The Administrator, in ascertaining whether the technology
was adequately demonstrated, was to consider the cost of achieving
desired reductions. The NSPS thus were not technology-forcing since
they did not necessarily require development of new technology, even
though that was one of the stated purposes of the NSPS. 1'56 In re-
sponse to a perceived need to provide more incentives for technologi-
cal development applicable to new stationary sources, the 1977
Amendments provide for Innovative Technology Waivers (ITW), 15 7
a concept first proposed in the 1976 House bill. 5 ' ITW's allow new
stationary sources to receive a waiver from NSPS during the develop-
ment process that excuses them from having to install already-devel-
oped technology to achieve NSPS.
Both the Senate5 9 and the House 6 ° included ITW proposals in
152. H.R. REP. No. 294, supranote 52, at 61-63, 68-69.
153. Id at 62.
154. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970) (currently codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 7411 (West Supp. 1977)).
155. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977)).
156. H.R. REp. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 168-69.
157. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 109, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(k) (West
Supp. 1977).
158. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1976).
159. S. REP. No. 127, note 5 supra
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their 1977 bills, but the final version of the 1977 Amendments basi-
cally mirrored the House provisions.16I As enacted, there are several
safeguards designed to ensure that ITW's are sparingly and justifia-
bly issued. First, the new system must utilize a continuous emission
system.' 62 Second, only the federally-promulgated NSPS can be
waived." 3 Thus, if the state has a more stringent emission standard
the ITW would not operate. Third, the new source must obtain writ-
ten consent from the governor of the state in which it desires to lo-
cate. '64 Fourth, notice and a public hearing must be afforded for the
Administrator's determination that the proposed system has not been
adequately demonstrated, that it will operate effectively, and that it
will achieve a greater rate of continuous emission reduction than
presently required by NSPS. The owner has the burden of showing
that the ITW will not threaten the public health, safety, or welfare
and that the duration of the ITW will not exceed the period deemed
necessary to adequately demonstrate that the new technology is in-
deed an improvement on the existing NSPS.'65 Finally, the ITW can-
not be issued where emissions from the proposed source will threaten
the attainment of any NPAAQS or NSAAQS, and the Administrator
is authorized to impose conditions to ensure that no such violation
occurs.' 66 Thus, the technology-forcing strategy of the NPAAQS-SIP
process cannot be circumvented by the use of ITW's. The ITW can-
not be granted for a period of more than seven years, and will auto-
matically expire four years after the date the source begins
operation. 167 If the Administrator feels that the new technology is not
161. The Senate had not included an ITW provision in its version of the 1976
Amendments. However, the final 1976 bill that emerged from the Conference Com-
mitee included the basic House provisions for ITW's, with some minor changes in-
volving extensions and time limits, which together made the ITW less flexible and
shorter m duration. H.R. REP. No. 1742, supra note 90, at 89-90. Compare S. 3219,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 109(a) (1976) with H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112
(1976) The 1977 Senate bill would have reduced the ten-year ITW originally pro-
posed in the House bill to a limited three-year waiver designed to encourage experi-
mentation with new technology while reemphasizing the need to protect the public
health. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 5, at 43. Compare S. 252,95th Cong., Ist Sess. §
9 (1977) with H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1976).




165. Id. § 741l(k)(l)(A)(i)-(iv).
166. Id. § 7411(k)(1)(B).
167. Id. § 7411(k)(1)(E). The original House proposal was for an ITW of up to
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being generated, he may terminate the ITW prior to its expiration
date and give the source a maximum of three years in which to
achieve NSPS.'68
Although ITW's create another individual source extension not
permitted under the 1970 Amendments, their availability is so limited
that they cannot subvert the basic technology-forcing strategy of the
Act. In fact, the legislative history makes quite clear that the primary
purpose of ITW's is to encourage technological innovations for new
sources, thus aiding in the drive to attain and maintain NPAAQS by
lowering the total amount of emissions into the ambient air. 169 Thus,
ITW's provide an impetus, lacking in the 1970 Amendments, for de-
veloping new source technology that would speed attainment of
NPAAQS in those areas presently in violation.
d. Coal Conversion Extensions (CCE)
With the Arab oil embargo came the realization that electrical gen-
erating plants burning oil and natural gas were dependent on a for-
eign supply that was both expensive and subject to immediate
curtailment. 7 ' One of the main objectives of President Carter's re-
cently announced National Energy Plan is the conversion of generat-
ing plants into coal-fired facilities because of the rapid depletion of
domestic oil and natural gas supplies. I7 ' The National Energy Plan,
however, was not the first attempt to reconcile the twin goals of en-
ergy independence and clean air. The Energy Supply and Environ-
mental Coordination Act of 1974 (ESECA), which amended the
Clean Air Act of 1970, allowed generating plants to waive compli-
ten years. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1976). The 1977 Senate bill pro-
posed a three-year maximum. S. 252, 95th Cong., ist Sess. § 9 (1977). See also S.
REp. No. 127, supra note 5, at 43.
168. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 109, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(k)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1977).
169. H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 170. The House Committee stated
that, "(w)ith these changes, the Committee believes that the availability of innovative
technology variances should help spur the development and use of new technology
without endangering public health or the environment." Id. A House Report noted
that the 1970 Amendment's use of NSPS would encourage a market for the develop-
ment of new technology that would merely encourage research and development of
new technology by companies marketing such devices and not by the emitters them-
selves, who would be safer in merely installing a known quantity (NSPS). H.R. REP.
No. 1175, supra note 47, at 168.
170. See generall, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 1-23 (1977).
171. Id at 63-66.
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ance with applicable SIP's if the plants were either under a coal con-
version order issued by the Federal Energy Administration or could
not obtain the low-sulfur coal or natural gas needed to attain the SIP
emission limitations. 72 The stopgap measure was both procedurally
and substantively complex. In addition, coal burning plants were
mentioned in a 1975 EPA Report as a notable exception to the other-
wise high percentage of compliance by major stationary sources. 17 3
This kind of tension between energy and environmental demands, as
reflected in the ESECA, was present in debating the utility of special-
ized exceptions for coal burning electrical generating plants. 174
In 1976, both the Senate and the House bills included provisions
for Coal Conversion Extensions (CCE), and sought to provide a more
relaxed standard for issuance than allowed under ESECA. 175 The
ESECA did not allow extensions in areas where the NPAAQS was
not attained for the particular pollutant in question. 17 6 This so-called
"regional limitation" made CCE's unavailable in areas that often
were most in need of relief. The 1976 House version sought to modify
the regional limitation by making rebuttable the presumption that a
CCE should not issue in non-attainment areas.' 7 7 The Senate bill
172. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§
791-98 (Supp. IV 1974). ESECA added a new section to the 1970 Amendments,
dovetailing with the newly developed Federal Energy Administration's authority to
control use of fuels. Seenote 113 supra
173. EPA, STATE AIR POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 12, 14 (1975).
174. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendaments-1975: Hearings on H. 2633 & H.
2650 Before the Subcomm on Health and the Environment of the House Comm on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 313-19 (1975) (testimony of
William Barclay, American Medical Association); id at 744-842 (testimony of Wil-
liam Lalor, Edison Electric Inst.); id at 822-90 (testimony of David Swan, American
Mining Cong.). See also 1974 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 44, at 3-30, 65-
184 (testimony of Aubrey Watner, Tennessee Valley Auth.); id at 30-65 (testimony of
A. Joseph Dowd, American Electric Power Co.); id at 265-87 (testimony of Frank
Milliken, Kennecott Copper Corp.); id at 649-93 (testimony of C. Howard Hardesty,
Continental Oil Co.).
175. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 106 (1976); S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §
15 (1976).
176. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 792
(Supp. IV 1974).
177. H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 61, 325-26. See note 182 infra. The
House bill would have liberalized the duration of the CCE by allowing an initial
exemption until January 1, 1980, and making possible an additional five-year exten-
sion. Id. at 61. The bill would have broadened the class of sources eligible for
CCE's by including those plants indicating an intention to convert to coal but which
had been prevented by an FEA order from making the switch. Id. The only safe-
guards designed to protect the public health and maintain the technology-forcing
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eliminated the regional limitation wording, substituting a provision
whereby the state could, in granting the CCE, require such interim
measures as were necessary to insure that the attainment or mainte-
nance of a NPAAQS was not threatened. 7 8
The 1976 Conference Committee, although basically adopting the
Senate version, retained two important aspects of the House bill by
maintaining the regional limitation as a rebuttable presumption, and
placing the power to deny a CCE in the hands of the EPA rather than
the states. 179 The Committee also limited the CCE to a maximum
three-year period following either the FEA curtailment order or the
emitter's notice of intent to convert to coal, but in no case would the
CCE extend beyond July 1, 1980.
After the 1976 Amendments failed to secure passage, both the
House and the Senate returned to their pre-1976 Conference pos-
tures. 80 The 1977 Conference Committee, reaching a different result
than the 1976 Conference, added safeguards against abuse of the
CCE while allowing for greater use of extensions. As finally enacted,
the 1977 Amendments returned the basic CCE program to the Ad-
ministrator rather than the states.' Following the approach taken
by the 1976 compromise, the 1977 Amendments modify the regional
limitation requirement by making it a rebuttable presumption." 2
strategy were the requirements that both the Governor and the Administrator grant
approval only after a finding that the general welfare would not be harmed. Id
The House Report specifically refers to the problem of the CCE causing harm to
tourist income and agricultural pursuits even in cases where only the NSAAQS were
being violated. In such a case the Administrator could, in his discretion, deny the
CCE. Id.
178. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1976), as reported in S. REP. No. 717,
supra note 47, at 170. The Senate version sought to transfer administration of the
CCE program from the EPA to state air pollution control agencies. Id. at 45-46.
The Administrator's review role, to ascertain whether the CCE threatened the general
welfare, was eliminated-in keeping with the Senate's intent to shift as much power
as possible back to the states. Id at 46.
179. H.R. REP. No. 1742, supranote 90, at 14-15, 93-94.
180. The 1977 versions of the bill were identical to the pre-1976 Conference posi-
tions, except that both the House and Senate extended the final compliance date to
July 1, 1981. See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 6, 79-81; S. REP. No. 127,
supra note 5, at 58-60, 166-68. Given this return to previous positions, one might have
predicted that the 1977 Conference would reach the same result as the 1976 Confer-
ence.
181. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 112(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(5)(B)
(West Supp. 1977).
182. To rebut this presumption, the source must convince the Administrator, after
notice and public hearing, that the pollutant emissions from such source (i) will only
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The Administrator was vested with power to grant CCE's in non-
attainment areas or to sources that might otherwise threaten
NPAAQS attainment.' 83 The Administrator was also given the duty
to prescribe interim emission limitations to insure that the burning of
coal will not produce emissions which cause or contribute to concen-
trations of any pollutant in excess of any NPAAQS. The final compli-
ance date for any CCE is December 31, 1980, despite the fact that
both the 1977 Senate and House bills had proposed a July 1, 1981,
deadline.' 84 However, the Amendments also allowed coal-fired gen-
erating facilities to apply for Delayed Complidnce Orders (DCO)
upon expiration of a CCE, thus extending final compliance an addi-
tional five years.'" 5
By retaining the "regional limitation" as a rebuttable presumption,
and maintaining the primary standard condition as an overall safe-
guard against wholesale granting of health-threatening CCE's, the
public health seemingly remains well protected. Thus, the stipulation
that a facility receiving a CCE through 1980 could then receive a
CDE, if qualified, did minimal damage to the integrity of the tech-
nology-forcing aspects of the 1977 Amendments. Clearly, CCE's will
not enable coal-burning plants to undermine public health. Such fa-
cilities are required to continue their efforts to develop the necessary
technology that will avoid contributing to violations of a NPAAQS.
e. Delayed Compliance Orders and Non-Compliance Penalties
Unlike the four extensions previously discussed, the provisions cre-
ating Delayed Compliance Orders (DCO) and Non-Compliance Pen-
alties (NCP) represent a basic departure from the technology-forcing
strategy of the 1970 Amendments. DCO's permit individual source
extensions beyond NPAAQS attainment dates, while NCP's impose
monetary penalties for continued operation. The requirement that a
source's emission not cause a violation of NPAAQS, present in other
extensions under the 1977 Amendments, is noticeably absent from
infrequently affect air quality concentrations for that pollutant in the AQCR; (ii) will
only have an insignificant effect on the air quality concentrations in each portion of
the region where the NPAAQS is being exceeded; and (iii) will, with reasonable sta-
tistical assurance, not cause or contribute to air quality concentrations in excess of
NPAAQS. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 112(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
7413(d)(5)(D)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1977).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 7413(d)(5XA). See note 180 supra.
185. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 14(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(5)(A)
(West Supp. Feb. 1978).
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the DCO and NCP procedures. Hence, the source need not develop
technology insofar as it is not forced to reduce emissions to a man-
dated level.
The need for DCO's was perceived to be particularly acute since,
in many areas, attainment dates had already passed without
NPAAQS having been achieved.' 86 Technically, a source not in com-
pliance with the approved SIP in a non-attainment area could be
forced to shut down, either by state or federal action or through a
citizen suit under section 304. The prevalent state and federal prac-
tice of granting variances for individual sources in disregard of the
attainment date appeared unauthorized and patently illegal. More-
over, such variances did not insulate the emitter against a citizen suit
forcing shutdown, even if the state or federal governments were es-
topped to take enforcement actions. 187 Additionally, of the estimated
200,000 stationary sources subject to SIP requirements, some 20,000
are major stationary sources emitting eighty-five percent of all sta-
tionary source air pollution.' Of these major emitters only eighty-
four percent were in compliance, leaving 3,200 major sources facing
shutdown orders.' 89 The problem was compounded by the fact that
many of the major sources identified by the EPA as significant
trouble spots were also key industries in terms of employment and
overall economic importance. These included coal-fired electrical
generating plants, petroleum refineries, and the steel industry. 19° It
seemed clear to Congress in 1976 that plant shutdowns mandated by
the technology-forcing strategy could not occur without severe eco-
nomic disruption. The section 110(f) variance mechanism, while still
available, seemed ineffective in light of the large numbers of non-
complying major sources.' 9 '
These concerns led the Senate in 1976 to develop the DCO-NCP
186. EPA, STATE AI POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1-4 (1975).
187. See notes 200 and 208 in/ra.
188. EPA, STATE AIR POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 9 (1975).
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id. at 13-17. For an in-depth study of the steel industry's problem in meet-
ing both air and water pollution standards, see COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES,
ENVIRONMENTAL STEEL UPDATE (1977); CoumcI ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, ENVI-
RONMENTAL STEEL (1975). For an in-depth study of the problems of electric utilities,
see COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIOITIES, PRICE OF POWER UPDATE (1977); COUNCIL
ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, PRICE OF POWER (1975).
191. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 271 (Powell, J., concurring) (justi-
fying noncompliance with the Clean Air Act's "inflexible demands").
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strategy as an alternative to technology-forcing. 192 The Senate placed
development of this new strategy high on its priority list in order to
prevent major shutdowns. 193 Consonant with its desire to decentral-
ize enforcement and administrative authority,' 94 the 1976 Senate bill
proposed giving the state primary authority to issue DCO's on its
own initiative.' The DCO was to extend compliance dates for indi-
vidual sources through January 1, 1979, even though the bill did not
extend the attainment dates for NPAAQS.'96 The Administrator's
role was to be limited to a review of the state-issued DCO within a
90-day period solely for the purpose of determining whether the
DCO met the statutory requirements. If the Administrator deter-
mined that the statutory requirements had not been met, he would
then issue a DCO after ensuring that the statutory mandate had been
complied with.
19 7
The Senate eliminated the section 110(f) requirement that the Ad-
ministrator must determine the good faith of the polluter prior to
granting a DCO, stating that it would unnecessarily lengthen the pro-
cedure for DCO issuance.' 9" The 1976 Senate bill also sought to deal
with already-issued compliance orders that had extended beyond the
attainment date.' 99 Those orders were to be modified so that the lat-
est date for compliance would be January 1, 1979, and all provisions
in such orders inconsistent with the DCO or NCP requirements were
192. The 1976 bills referred to the DCO and NCP as "compliance date extension
orders" and "noncompliance penalties," but for the sake of clarity they will be re-
ferred to as DCO's and NCP's, the labels given them by the 1977 Amendments.
Compare S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1976) withClean Air Act Amendments of
1977, §§ 112, 118, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7413, 7420 (West Supp. Feb. 1978).
193. S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 4.
194. See note 178 supra
195. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1976) as reported in S. REP. No. 717,
supra note 47, at 34-35, 169. Under the Senate bill a state could issue a DCO after
notice and a public hearing, provided the DCO (1) contained a schedule and timeta-
ble for compliance; (2) contained any interim control measures deemed reasonable by
either the state or the Administrator (3) required monitoring and reporting by the
source; (4) provided for compliance as expeditiously as practicable; and (5) contained,
for major emitting facilities, a provision for imposition of an NCP if the source failed
to comply by January 1, 1979. Id
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 34.
199. See note 208 infra. The Senate cclearly felt that these orders issued under §
113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (1970), were illegal. S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at
34-35,
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to be rendered void.2" Thus while the attainment date for NPAAQS
remained the same, the date for final compliance by individual
sources was to be extended to January 1, 1979, eliminating the shut-
down alternative as an incentive for the emitter to develop new tech-
nology needed to achieve NPAAQS.2°1
As a substitute for the shutdown alternative, the Senate developed
the NCP, which was to be imposed only upon those sources not meet-
ing the extended compliance date of January 1, 1979.202 All major
emitting facilities °3 with compliance dates beyond January 1, 1978,
were to supply the Administrator with certain information by Janu-
ary 1, 1977, so that he could determine the NCP to be imposed if
compliance was not attained by January 1, 1979.2 04 The ostensible
purpose of the NCP was to eliminate the economic advantage of non-
compliance for major emitting facilities by making it cheaper to com-
ply than to pay the attorney's fees needed to defeat implementation
and enforcement.2 °5 The NCP was to be computed to equalize the
full cost of compliance, calculated over a period of ten years. To alle-
viate hardship it was to be paid monthly. The states, acting under
guidelines to be promulgated by the Administrator, were to be given
primary authority in setting NCP's, with the Administrator retaining
authority to review state-set NCP's and revise them upwards if he
deemed them too low.2°" The Senate thus sought to end the six-year
pattern of court-imposed delay that the shutdown alternative pro-
duced under the 1970 Amendments.20 7
200. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1976) as reported in S. REP. No. 717,
supranote 47, at 171.
201. The 1976 Senate bill also created two special kinds of NCO's: one for sources
which were undergoing a "change in production process" and another for those
sources utilizing new technology. See S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 36-37. See
also notes 246-54 and accompanying text infra.
202. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(b) (1976). SeegenerallyS. REP. No. 717,
supra note 47, at 38-39.
203. Major emitting facilities are defined to include those stationary sources hav-
ing the potential to emit 100 tons of pollutants per year. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 33 (1976) as reaported in S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 221.
204. See generally S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 38.
205. The Senate Report explains: "Without some new, effective and fair tool for
enforcement, many sources continue to find the fees paid to attorneys to resist the
requirements of law less expensive than pollution control equipment." Id
206. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(b) (1976) as reported in S. REP. No. 717,
supra note 47, at 39.
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The 1976 House bill totally eliminated the Section 110(f) variance
provision and completely reworked the DCO process.2"' The House
bill proposed a complex procedural system. The DCO process was to
be initiated by an application from the owner or operator of the sta-
tionary source. The Administrator could be the issuing authority if
written permission was given by the governor of the affected state, or
the state could issue the DCO to major stationary sources. In the lat-
ter situation, the DCO for a major stationary source was to be subject
to substantive review by the Administrator, although DCO's for
small stationary sources were to be subject only to procedural re-
209
view.
The House bill differed from the Senate's in other respects as well.
The House clearly intended to allow DCO's to be issued even though
the NPAAQS were not attained within the relevant AQCR, although
the compliance dates for other stationary sources not receiving
DCO's were not to be extended. 210 As proposed, the DCO could ex-
tend the compliance deadline for a particular source up to five years
past the attainment date.21 ' By imposing a new mandatory deadline,
and coupling it with interim control requirements, the House sought
to maintain an incentive to develop new technology while simultane-
ously protecting the public health as well as preventing serious eco-
nomic disruptions due to plant closures.212 The House reinforced the
technology-forcing aspects of the DCO process by emphasizing that
the DCO was only a discretionary tool in the hands of the Adminis-
trator. In all cases the burden of proving that all statutory require-
ments were satisfied was placed upon the emitter, with the
Administrator having discretion to deny the permit.2 1 The House
208, See H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 38. The House also believed that
the Administrator's practice of issuing § 113(a) orders beyond the attainment date was
illegal and ill-founded. Id.
209. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1976) as reported in H.R. REP. No.
1175, supra note 47, at 331.
210. H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 38-39.
211. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 121 (1976). See generally H.R. REp. No.
1175, supra note 47, at 47.48.
212. H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 4749.
213. Id. at 50-51. The House Report said:
Second, the technology-forcing reasons referred to previously favor a discretion-
ary CDE authority. If a CDE were mandated whenever the conditions of sec-
tion 121(c) were met, sources might be encouraged to devote their sole or
primary effort to perfecting their case for a CDE, rather than to the task of re-
search and development to make available the equipment needed to comply.
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recognized that it was opening the door to consideration of economic
and technological feasibility claims, but concluded that the door was
only slightly ajar.214
The House, like the Senate, had decided that the regulatory "all-
or-nothing" shutdown approach utilized in the 1970 Amendments
was inadequate. However, each house emphasized different factors in
developing its own NCP system.215 The Senate intended to give emit-
ters a two-year grace period by providing for no payment of a NCP
prior to January 1, 1979. The House, on the other hand, wanted a
more immediate cessation of non-complying emissions, and thus pro-
posed allowing the Administrator to impose a NCP as a condition to
the granting of any DCO if certain findings were made.21 6 Under the
House bill, if the source seeking the DCO was a major emitting facil-
ity and the circumstances prompting the DCO request were not pri-
marily beyond the facility's control, then the imposition of a NCP
was made mandatory. The NCP could be imposed only after the Ad-
ministrator gave notice and held a formal adjudicatory hearing. 217
Under the House version the NCP was both a penalty and a fine,
since fault was a relevant factor in the setting of the NCP. This dif-
fered from the Senate version, which was primarily concerned with
the recoupment of the economic advantage of non-compliance rather
than in penalizing the bad faith emitter.218 These differences were
resolved in the 1976 Conference Report, which basically incorpo-
rated the Senate provisions for both the DCO and NCP with only
minor amendments.21 9
In 1977 the House reacted to the defeat of the 1976 Amendments
by making some important and substantial departures from its 1976
position.220 In an attempt to simplify the complex 1976 DCO provi-
sions, the House Committee liberalized the DCO process by eliminat-
ing the five grounds for the granting of a DCO, proposing instead a
214. Id. at 51.
215. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1976). See generall H.R. REP. No.
1175, supra note 47, at 54-58.
216. H.L 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1976).
217. 1d See also H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 57.
218. Compare H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1976) with S. 3219, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(b) (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 59; S.
Rrx. No. 717, supra note 47, at 39-40.
219. H.R. REP. No. 1742, supranote 90, at 90-92.
220. Compare H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 103 (1977) with H.R. 10498, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1976). See generaly H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 59.
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catch-all requirement that the source be unable to comply with the
original deadline."2 ' The Committee reiterated the basic concept that
allowed DCO's to be issued in non-attainment areas even if the sta-
tionary source's non-compliance was a cause of non-attainment. 2 '
The new bill, like the 1976 Senate version, did not require an applica-
tion from a source and allowed either the state or Administrator to
issue the DCO. Finally, where the 1976 House bill called for an adju-
dicatory hearing prior to the issuance of the DCO, the 1977 bill
merely required an informal legislative-type hearing. 23 This last
amendment reflected the EPA position that section 110(f) was un-
workable primarily because it triggered an adjudicatory hearing
process for thousands of sources, a process which the EPA was not
equipped to handle. 2 4
The 1977 House bill also proposed several substantial changes in
the NCP process in conformity with the Senate's goal of eliminating
the economic advantage of non-compliance and thus encouraging
compliance as soon as practicable.2 25 The new NCP was to be ap-
plied primarily to major stationary sources that were in violation of
an applicable implementation plan. It would also apply to any statio-
nary source violating a hazardous emission standard or NSPS, or
which was granted a DCO, CCE or PNSO and was not in compli-
ance with the applicable interim emission standards.226 The NCP
would not apply to a source issued a DCO if non-compliance was
due to an FEA order to utilize a different fuel, or to a source holding
a DCO and able to sustain the burden of showing that its inability to
comply was due to circumstances beyond its control.227 Unlike the
1976 bill, the NCP would not be immediately applicable but would
allow the source a two-year "grace" period in which to comply volun-
tarily with applicable emission standards. The NCP procedural proc-
ess was left basically unchanged. Finally, the NCP amount was to be
the equivalent of the compliance costs alone.2 28
221. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 56-57.
222. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1977).
223. Compare H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1977) with H.R. 10498, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1976). See generaly H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 58-
59.
224. See note 65 supra.
225. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 77-78.
226. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1977).
227, Id. The House intended this to be a narrow loophole. H.R. REP. No. 294,
supra note 52, at 76-77.
228. Although the NCP was predicated on the costs of compliance, the House Re-
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Having successfully won over the House conferees in 1976, the
Senate in 1977 did little more than extend the final deadline for
DCO's from January 1, 1979, to July 1, 1979.229 The NCP provisions
were likewise retained, except for date changes reflecting the change
in the DCO deadline.23
The 1977 Amendments basically returned to the Senate version
that had prevailed the year before. The state is to be the primary
issuer of DCO's, although the Administrator may issue them after
giving notice to the states.231 Individual sources are not required to
apply in order to trigger the DCO mechanism. The House did give
the Administrator a greater role in the DCO process than would have
been allowed by the proposed 1976 Amendments. The Administrator
now has a substantive review role for state-issued DCO's to major
stationary sources, and only a procedural review role for DCO's is-
sued to all other sources.2 32 The requirement of interim emission
standards designed to force compliance as expeditiously as practica-
ble is retained. These interim standards must include measures
designed to avoid substantial endangerment of the public health. In
addition, the Amendments require utilization of best practicable con-
trol systems for DCO-issued sources. 233 The final compliance date for
all DCO's is July 1, 1979, or three years after the date for final com-
pliance specified in the plan, whichever is later.234 Finally, the DCO
port indicated that the penalty could exceed the equivalent of the costs of compliance.
H.R. R p. No. 294, spranote 52, at 77-78.
229. S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l1(a) (1977). See generally S. REP. No. 127,
supranote 5, at 43-48.
230. S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(b) (1977). All sources receiving a DCO
allowing compliance later than July 1, 1978, had to furnish the state with the informa-
tion needed to determine the NCP no later than Oct. 1, 1977.
231. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 112, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(1) (West
Supp. 1977).
232. Compare H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1976) with Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, § 112, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
233. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 112(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(6), (7)
(West Supp. 1977).
234. Id. § 7413(d)(1)(D). Apparently under pressure from Louisville Gas & Elec-
tric, the recipient of an "illegal" § 113(a) compliance order, the July 1, 1979, deadline
was eliminated for that particular source. Id. See 123 CONG. REc. 59,435 (daily ed.
June 10, 1977) (amendment of Sen. Huddleston). Other recipients of § 113(a) orders
or consent decrees extending beyond July 1, 1979, were deemed to be "valid" unless
modified within one year of the enactment of the 1977 Amendments. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, § 112(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(12) (West Supp. 1977).
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for major stationary sources must contain a provision for the pay-
ment of the NCP if compliance is not achieved by July 1, 1979.
The NCP provisions, on the other hand, represent a more equitable
compromise between the House and Senate proposals.235 The Ad-
ministrator, within six months, must promulgate regulations requir-
ing the assessment and collection of NCP's against covered sources.
States can assume primary responsibility for NCP's only after sub-
mitting, for approval by the Administrator, a plan for levying and
collection. Yet even with an approved state plan the Administrator
can still levy and collect NCP's in the absence of proper state action.
These provisions reflect the House's greater reluctance to shift major
decisionmaking authority to the states.236
NCP's are to be assessed against any major source not in compli-
ance with an applicable implementation plan or agreement, any
source not in compliance with a NSPS or hazardous emission stan-
dard, or any source receiving a DCO or PNSO that is not in compli-
ance with an interim emission standard.237 Exceptions from the
application of the NCP mechanism were created for sources operat-
ing under CCE's or FEA orders to convert to coal, for sources given
ITW's or TES's, and for sources that are unable to comply due to
circumstances beyond their control. These exceptions will cease if the
source fails to comply with any applicable interim emission stand-
ards.
The 1977 Amendments retain the House and Senate requirement
that NCP's can be assessed and collected only after an adjudicatory
hearing. The assessment of the NCP is to eliminate only the eco-
nomic advantages of non-compliance.238 The 1977 Amendments re-
tain certain provisions from the House bill that tend to unnecessarily
complicate the NCP assessment process. The 1977 House bill had
neatly divided the NCP process into two periods. First, it provided
that no NCP's would be imposed until two years after the enactment
date of the Amendments, thus giving the sources a "grace period" in
235. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 52, at 138-40.
236. Id. at 140. See also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 118, 42 U.S.C.A.§§ 7420(a)(1), 7420(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1977).
237. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 118, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(a)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1977). This approach is similar to that proposed in the 1977 House bill.
SeeH.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1977).
238. H.R. REP. No. 564, supranote 52, at 140.
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which to comply voluntarily.2 3 9 Then, for all sources given non-com-
pliance notices more than two years after the date of enactment, the
NCP would be effective immediately.24 The 1977 Amendments re-
tain the two-year grace period, measured from the date of enactment,
but inexplicably set July 1, 1979, as the date upon which immediately
effective NCP's are to begin.24 Because the Amendments became ef-
fective on August 7, 1977, there is a six-week overlap in which both
provisions are applicable. The Conference Committee sheds no light
on why the change was made.242 To avoid unnecessary litigation, the
Administrator may choose to delay all matters of non-compliance to
August 8, 1979, a six-week delay beyond the formal date for compli-
ance under the DCO procedure. The 1977 Amendments also retain
the House version's two-year delay in collecting NCP's with a
mandatory settlement proceeding at the termination of the pay-
ments.243 The Amendments deal with the problem of not-yet-
promulgated emission limitations by adopting the Senate language
requiring the imposition of NCP's for all sources not in compliance
with the emission limitations within three years after enactment of
such limitations. 2' The Amendments also tie in the limited judicial
review mandate by requiring that any lawsuit attacking a NCP regu-
lation be filed within sixty days, thereby shielding the regulation from
subsequent attack in later civil or criminal proceedings.2 41
239. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 105 (1977). See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra
note 52, at 77.
240. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1977).
241. Compare Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 118, 42 U.S.C.A. §
7420(d)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1977) with H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 105 (1977).
This provision reads:
(C) For the purpose of this section, the term 'period of covered noncompliance'
means the period which begins - (i) two years after the date of enactment of
this section, in the case of a source for which notice of noncompliance
under subsection (b)(3) is issued on or before the date two years after such
date of enactment, or
(ii) on the date of issuance of the notice of noncompliance under subsection
(b)(3), in the case of a source for which such notice is issued after July 1,
1979 ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(d)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1977).
242. H.R. REP. No. 564, supranote 52, at 133-34.
243. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 118, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(d) (West
Supp. 1977).
244. Id § 7420(g).
245. Id § 7420(e).
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f. Specialized Delayed Compliance Orders
In addition to the DCO, the 1977 Amendments authorize issuance
of Specialized Delayed Compliance Orders (SDCO) in situations
where the source is making certain fundamental changes in its opera-
tion.246 A SDCO relieves the source of its obligation to meet interim
emission standards, but requires it to post a bond or other surety
equalling the cost of actual compliance plus any economic advan-
tages that would have accrued because of non-compliance.2 47 Failure
to achieve final compliance by July 1, 1979, will result in forfeiture of
the bond or surety.248 SDCO's may be issued only where the source
intends to achieve compliance with the applicable implementation
plan by replacing the facility, completely changing the emission-caus-
ing production process, or terminating the generation.
2 49
The SDCO concept was exclusively a Senate proposal in both
1976250 and 1977. The 1976 Conference Committee accepted the Sen-
ate approach to SDCO's without change.21' The legislative history
reflects the fact that these SDCO's were to be a narrow loophole re-
quiring fundamental changes in the operation of the source before it
could be freed from the interim emission standard requirement.2z 2 In
1977 the Senate retained its 1976 SDCO process intact.253 Thus, the
1977 Amendments as enacted restored the SDCO process originally
contained in the 1976 Senate bill with only an amendment that
changed the final compliance date to July 1, 1979.254




250. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1976) as reported in S. REP. No. 717,
supra note 47, at 169.
251. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1977) as reported in H.R. REP. No. 1742,
supra note 90, at 14.
252. S. REP. No. 717, supra note 47, at 36.
253. S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l1(a) (1977). See also S. REP. No. 127, supra
note 5, at 46.
254. Compare Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 112(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413
(West Supp. 1977) with S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1977) as reported in S.
REP. No. 717, supranote 47, at 169.
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Legislative Mandate
It was clear from the legislative history of the 1970 Amendments
that Congress was frustrated with both administrative and judicial
delays in the enforcement and implementation of previous air pollu-
tion legislation.255 This frustration resulted in the enactment of sec-
tion 307 of the 1970 Amendments, 256 an attempt to expedite the
judicial review process to avoid unnecessary delays in attaining the
statute's goals. Congressional statements evinced a concern that the
attainment of NPAAQS within a three-year period would be impossi-
ble without some means of shortening the judicial review process and
foreclosing individual attacks on implementation plans that might
force reformulation of the state implementation plan under attack.257
The limitation of judicial review could not insure the attainment of
NPAAQS within three years, but without it chances of attainment
were extremely limited.
As originally enacted, section 307 called for the review of the Ad-
ministrator's decision regarding any SIP in the United States Court
255. For an excellent review of the legislative history of the judicial review sec-
tions of the 1970 Amendments, see Luneburg & Roselle, Judicial Review under the
CleanAlrActAmendments of197a 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 667 (1974). See also
Kramer IL supra note 6, at 197-99. But see Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal
Pollution Law; 62 IowA L. Rnv. 1221, 1254-61 (1977).
256. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307,42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b). Section 307 provided in
part:
(b)(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating
any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission
standard under section 1857c-7 of this title, any standard of performance under
section 1857c-6 of this title, any standard under section 1857f-I of this title (other
than a standard required to be prescribed under section 1857f-l(b)(l) of this ti-
tle), and determination under section 1857f-l(b)(5) of this title, any control or
prohibition under section 1857f-6c of this title, or any standard under section
1857f-9 of this title may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of
this title or section 1857c-6(d) of this title may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed
within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval, or after such
date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for enforcement.
257. See, e.g, S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 8, at 21, 23, 41. See generally
Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 255, at 675-79.
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of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.2 58 Lawsuits challenging
NPAAQS, NSPS, or hazardous emission standards had to be ffied in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
within thirty days of the Administrator's action. Judicial review of
such action in civil or criminal proceedings beyond the thirty-day pe-
riod was precluded 259 unless the grounds for appeal arose after the
thirty-day period had expired.26
In 1976 only the House sought to modify section 307, proposing
merely to extend the filing period from thirty to sixty days.26' The
1977 House Report reemphasized the intent of Congress to restrict
review to the sixty-day period, concluding that the limitation pro-
vided for a "legally adequate opportunity for judicial review."1262 As
finally enacted in the 1977 Amendments, this extension of the limita-
tion period was the only change in section 307.263
Thus, Congress sought to retain intact the device created in
1970--the imposition of a short limitations period to condense the
litigation into the shortest constitutionally permissible period. In so
doing, the Congress left many questions unanswered regarding the
operation and validity of the section 307 review process, which had
not yet been before the Supreme Court.
B. Section 307 in the Courts
In seeking to interpret section 307 prior to Union Electric, several
circuits went different directions in attempting to circumvent the
clear congressional goal of limiting the ability of litigants to raise fea-
sibility claims.21 Many observers saw Union Electric as an opportu-
258. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970) (currently codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607 (West Supp. 1977)).
259, Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970) (amended
1977). This provision was borrowed from the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
50 U.S.C. § 902 (1942).
260. Clean Air Act of 1970, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970) (amended
1977).
261. Compare H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305 (1976) with S. 3219, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) as reported in H.R. REP. No. 1742, supra note 90, at 68. See
also H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 263; H.R. REP. No. 1742, supra note 90, at
124-25.
262. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 52, at 322.
263. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7601(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1977) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970)).
264. For a general discussion, see Kramer II, supra note 6, at 194-202. See also
Currie, supranote 255, at 1254-60.
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nity to answer some of the difficult constitutional and statutory issues
raised by this sharp limitation on judicial review. In the case, peti-
tioner Union Electric Company had sought to attack, after the thirty-
day period, certain provisions of the Missouri SIP.265 The Supreme
Court focused only indirectly on the judicial review provisions of sec-
tion 307, emphasizing instead the scope of the Administrator's power
to approve or disapprove SIP's under section 110.266 The Supreme
Court merely concluded that feasibility issues were not among the
factors to be considered by the Administrator in reviewing a submit-
ted SIP under section 110. That being so, there was no jurisdiction in
the Court of Appeals to hear those issues in post-thirty-day litiga-
tion.267 Because the constitutionality of section 307 was not at issue in
Union Electric, the Supreme Court specifically declined to decide
whether violators of an SIP could raise economic or technological
infeasibility as a defense to civil or criminal enforcement proceed-
ings.2
6 8
In section 307 decisions subsequent to Union Electric, the Courts
of Appeals have taken other approaches to the problem. In Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 2 6 9 petitioner attacked an EPA-issued abate-
ment order and questioned the underlying constitutionality of the
state regulation alleged to have been violated.27° The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's constitutional
claim that the regulation was unenforceable. The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the attack on the validity of the SIP provisions was
"presented out of time and in the wrong forum."' 271 The court reaf-
265. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), afa' 427 U.S. 246
(1976).
266. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-66 (1976). See Clean Air Act of
1970, § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
7410(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977)).
267. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1976). The Eighth Circuit
dismissed the action for lack ofjurisdiction. 515 F.2d 206, 216 (8th Cir. 1975). The
Supreme Court merely affirmed the dismissal, although the Court's opinion intimates
a conclusion on the merits that feasibility challenges must fail in § 307 proceedings.
The Court did not tackle the problem as to when and where a polluter may be entitled
to raise feasibility issues. See Kramer II, supra note 6, at 199-201.
268. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 268 n.18 (1976). The Court, in a later
footnote, declined to answer a question raised by Union Electric whether polluters
have a due process right to raise feasibility issues in a § 307(b)(1) proceeding if they
show that review of those issues is not available elsewhere. Id at 269 n.19.
269. 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977).
270. Id. at 885-87, 892.
271. Id. at 892.
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firmed the statutory time limit, which was "designed to get issues re-
solved promptly and thereby prevent delay in cleaning the air." '272
However, in United States v. Interlake273 the United States sought
injunctive relief to prohibit Interlake from operating a Chicago by-
product coke facility in violation of certain SIP provisions.274 The
defendant argued that the emission standard alleged to have been
violated was vague and therefore a violation of due process. The
United States argued that the rule should have been challenged in a
section 307 proceeding, and since the thirty-day period had elapsed
those issues could not be raised.275 The court concluded, citing Union
Electric, that because feasibility claims could not be heard in the
original proceeding they could not be barred in any later criminal or
civil enforcement proceeding. 276 The result opens a Pandora's box of
individual infeasibility claims and delayed attacks on the SIP that
Congress had deemed inconsistent with its technology-forcing strat-
egy.2 7 7
Finally, in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,2 78 the United
States Supreme Court was faced with a direct attack on the validity
of section 307 and its preclusion of judicial review in subsequent
criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. Petitioner had been in-
dicted for violation of the hazardous emission standard for asbes-
tos.279 Under section 112 the Administrator was authorized to
promulgate hazardous emission standards for designated pollutants.
In the case of friable asbestos emissions caused by the demolition of
buildings, the Administrator had promulgated a "work practice stan-
dard" requiring the demolition crew to water down the building prior
to demolition. Petitioner was individually notified of the wetting re-
quirement but chose to ignore the notice. The United States then
sought to establish criminal liability under section 113(c)(1)(C) for a
272. Id. at 893, citing Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925, 926 (7th Cir.
1974).
273. 429 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
274. Id. at 195.
275. Id. at 197.
276. Id. at 197-98. The court cited Indiana and Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509
F.2d 839, 845-47 (7th Cir. 1975), a pre- Union Electric case, to support its finding that
feasibility and constitutional issues can be raised in later enforcement actions because
they are not part of the Administrator's original decision to approve an SIP.
277. See H.R. REP. No. 1175, supra note 47, at 51.
278. 98 S. Ct. 566 (1978).
279. ld. at 569-70. See Clean Air Act of 1970, § 112,42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(c)(1)(B)
(1970) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1977)).
19781
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
knowing violation of a hazardous emission standard.28 0 The position
of the United States, which had been supported in the Sixth Cir-
cuit,28 ' was that section 307(b) precluded putting the validity of a
hazardous emission standard at issue in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding beyond the thirty-day time period.282 The petitioner argued
that, while section 307 did preclude the reviewing of an emission
standard in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the defendant could
still claim that the so-called emission standard was not an emission
standard, and thus beyond the authority of the Administrator to is-
sue.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-man majority, held that the
district court could determine whether the underlying hazardous
emission standard was in reality a standard. Rehnquist saw the basic
purposes of section 307(b)(2) as two-fold in nature: first, to insure that
the substantive provisions of the standard would be uniformly ap-
plied and interpreted, and second, to insure that the circumstances of
its adoption would be quickly reviewed by a single court.28 '
While carefully avoiding the constitutional issues implicit in limit-
ing judicial review, the majority felt the complexity of the 1970
Amendments militated against repudiating review in all situations in
which criminal penalties could be imposed.284 The Court was partic-
280. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 570 (1978). See Clean
Air Act of 1970, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1)(C) (1970) (currently codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1977)).
281. United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1976).
282. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 569-70 (1978). In fact,
a petition for review of the "work practice standard" was fied, under § 307, in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Since the suit was filed beyond the
thirty-day period, the court dismissed the action without any decision on the merits.
Dore Wrecking Co. v. Fri, No. 73-1686 (U.S. App. D.C., filed Aug. 1, 1973).
283. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 572 (1978).
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
thought that the primary congressional purpose in enacting § 307(b)(2) was to create a
unified and expedited judicial review procedure, one which he sees as being destroyed
by the majority's approach. Id at 576-77 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court seem-
ingly ignores its previous statements endorsing the congressional mandate imposing a
technology-forcing strategy. As Justice Stewart points out, the result of the majority's
interpretation is clearly antithetical to the intent to "maintain the integrity of the time
sequences provided through the Act." Id, citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 41 (1970).
284. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 569-70 (1978). The
Sixth Circuit, in upholding the position of the United States, relied heavily on Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), where the Supreme Court had upheld limita-
tions placed on judicial review under the Emergency Price Control Act. United
States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1976). Seenote 259 su.pra
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ularly impressed with the fact that the 1970 Amendments imposed
criminal penalties only upon a specific class of violators involved in
extremely hazardous or willful activities. The Court adduced from
this congressional scheme a decision to penalize more harshly the vi-
olators of "emission standards" as opposed to other Administrator-
promulgated rules.285 From that finding the Court inferred an intent
to specifically and narrowly define "emission standards" and not let
the Administrator define them through personal fiat.286 The Court
felt that the decision, in light of its carefully proscribed limits, would
not do violence to the overall congressional scheme.
2 87
In instructing the district court as to its role in defining an "emis-
sion standard" in a criminal proceeding, the Court severely restricted
the scope of a trial court's inquiry. The district court cannot, under
the guise of defining a regulation as an emission standard, engage in
a sweeping judicial review of the underlying regulation.2"' The sole
avenue of inquiry for the court to follow is whether the standard
forming the basis of the violation is an "emission standard" within
the broad congressional meaning of that term.28 9 There is to be no
determination as to the rationality of the regulation, whether the ac-
tivity was supported by the record or is otherwise arbitrary, or even
whether the Administrator met the procedural requirements in
promulgating the regulation in question.
After overcoming the section 307(b) prohibition, the Court then
decided the merits, with dissent by Justice Stevens, that the particular
regulation violated was a work practice standard and not an emission
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, also reserved decision on the constitutional-
ity of § 307 while hinting that he sees an important distinction between Yakus and
A4damo Wrecking. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 575-76
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 572. One of the reasons given for this deduction was a lack of notice,
even though the defendant had been notified of the wetting requirement prior to the
demolition of the building. Since there had been notice and a subsequent promise to
comply, defendant committed a knowing violation of the regulation. Id. at 579 n.12
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 572. The Court further stated that where there is an "ambiguity in a
criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant." Id. at 572-73, citing
United States v. Bass, 401 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
287. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 573 (1978). Justice
Stewart argued that other determinations, such as the designation of a substance as a
"hazardous pollutant," might also fall under the majority's holding, thus destroying
the very purpose of § 307. Id at 576-77 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 573.
289. Id.
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standard as defined under section 112. The indictment fell, since
there was no violation of a regulation under section 112 and therefore
no criminal liability under section 113.290
This five-four decision is another major blow at the technology-
forcing strategy. However, because the Court did not strike down the
limitation contained in section 307 on constitutional grounds, and be-
cause it carefully limited the exception it recognized, the blow is
probably not fatal.291 In fact, the major issues left unresolved by
Union Electric remain unanswered. Adamo Wrecking stands for the
proposition that, under a limited set of circumstances, a criminal de-
fendant may question whether the regulation forming the subject
matter of his indictment is in fact an emission standard capable of
triggering criminal enforcement proceedings. Adamo Wrecking does
not deal with civil enforcement proceedings, and arguably one may
infer from the Court's emphasis on the unique and special nature of
the criminal liability provision of the 1970 Amendments that such a
review in civil enforcement proceedings is indeed precluded. jearly,
Adamo Wrecking does not permit feasibility issues to be raised as
defenses in enforcement proceedings. Such a result would have dealt
a final blow to the remnants of the technology-forcing strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Powell was particularly prescient when he predicted Con-
gress would strike a new balance given the alternative of major utility
shutdowns. Yet, the 1977 Amendments reflect more a mid-course
correction for the technology-forcing strategy initially mandated in
1970 than a total rejection. The extension of the attainment date to
1982 and beyond clearly removes any immediate pressure on pol-
luters to develop new and cleaner technologies. The addition of nu-
merous new extension and waiver provisions also weakens the
technology-forcing strategy and gives greater discretion to state and
federal officials than had been previously authorized. The shutdown
alternative, once seen as a viable option, has been weakened but not
totally eliminated. In its place are monetary penalties designed to
eliminate the competitive advantages gained by fighting the system
rather than controlling emissions. Notwithstanding a lengthy judicial
struggle with the concept of shutdown and future opportunities for
judicial delay, even in the face of strong language from the Supreme
290. Id. at 573-75.
291. See note 284 supra.
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Court, congressional action in 1977 may have not been as debilitating
as initially thought. The 1977 Amendments retained health-based
ambient air quality standards, which came under attack for the first
time at the legislative level. The 1977 Amendments also reempha-
sized the congressional intent to protect the public health even if it
entails great expense or the possibility of shutdowns. Thus, while a
new balance was struck, the overall commitment to protecting the
public health has not been greatly weakened.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court seems to forget its prior
recognition of the technology-forcing strategy, at least in a criminal
enforcement setting. By virtue of Train and Union Electric the
Supreme Court embraced the congressional mandate to utilize the
technology-forcing strategy in order to maximize protection of the
public health. In Adamo Wrecking, however, Justice Rehnquist,
without referring to either Train or Union Electric,292 engages in an
attenuated reading of legislative history to conclude that a defendant
has the right to question the authority of the Administrator to pro-
mulgate a regulation under which the enforcement proceeding is
brought. This is a critical flaw in the Court's analysis that, if ex-
panded, might cause the demise of the technology-forcing strategy.
The 1977 Amendments and Adamo Wrecking compromise the
technology-forcing strategy with an approach that may be more
palatable for courts, emitters, and implementers to accept. Yet no cer-
tainty exists that the compromise will encourage industrial compli-
ance rather than opposition, even though the shutdown alternative
has been practically eliminated.
292. Train is cited in a footnote without reference to the technology-forcing strat-
egy. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566, 573 n.5 (1978).
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